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1. Introduction
A current issue inmonetary economics is that theNewKeynesianmodelmakes several anomalous
predictions when the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (ZLB) is binding: implausibly
large collapse of output and ination (Eggertsson and Woodford 2004; Eggertsson 2011; Werning
2011); implausibly large effect of forward guidance (Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson 2015;
Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian 2015; Cochrane 2017); and implausibly large effect of government
spending (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2011; Woodford 2011; Cochrane 2017).
Several papers have developed variants of the New Keynesian model that behave well at the
ZLB (Gabaix 2016; Diba and Loisel 2019; Cochrane 2018; Bilbiie 2019; Acharya and Dogra 2019);
but these variants are more complex than the standard model. In some cases the derivations are
complicated by bounded rationality or heterogeneity. In other cases the dynamical system repre-
senting the equilibrium—normally composed of an Euler equation and a Phillips curve—includes
additional differential equations that describe bank-reserve dynamics, price-level dynamics, or
the evolution of the wealth distribution. Moreover, a good chunk of the analysis is conducted by
numerical simulations. Hence, it is sometimes difcult to grasp the nature of the anomalies and
their resolutions.
It may therefore be valuable to strip the logic to the bone. We do so using a New Keynesian
model in which relative wealth enters the utility function. The justication for the assumption is
that relativewealth is amarker of social status, andpeople valuehigh social status.Wedeviate from
the standard model only minimally: the derivations are the same; the equilibrium is described by
a dynamical system composed of an Euler equation and a Phillips curve; the only difference is an
extra term in the Euler equation. We also veer away from numerical simulations and establish
our results with phase diagrams describing the dynamics of output and ination given by the
Euler-Phillips system. Themodel’s simplicity and the phase diagrams allow us to gain new insights
into the anomalies and their resolutions.1
Using the phase diagrams,we begin by depicting the anomalies in the standardNewKeynesian
model. First, we nd that output and ination collapse to unboundedly low levels when the ZLB
episode is arbitrarily long-lasting. Second, we nd that there is a duration of forward guidance
1Our approach relates to the work of Michaillat and Saez (2014), Ono and Yamada (2018), and Michau (2018). By
assuming wealth in the utility function, they obtain non-New-Keynesian models that behave well at the ZLB. But
their results are not portable to the New Keynesian framework because they require strong forms of wage or price
rigidity (exogenous wages, xed ination, or downward nominal wage rigidity). Our approach also relates to the
work of Fisher (2015) and Campbell et al. (2017), who build New Keynesian models with government bonds in the
utility function. The bonds-in-the-utility assumption captures special features of government bonds relative to other
assets, such as safety and liquidity (for example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2012). While their assumption
and ours are conceptually different, they affect equilibrium conditions in a similar way. These papers use their
assumption to generate risk-premium shocks (Fisher) and to alleviate the forward-guidance puzzle (Campbell et al.).
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above which any ZLB episode, irrespective of its duration, is transformed into a boom. Such boom
is unbounded when the ZLB episode is arbitrarily long-lasting. Third, we nd that there is an
amount of government spending at which the government-spending multiplier becomes innite
when the ZLB episode is arbitrarily long-lasting. Furthermore, when government spending
exceeds this amount, an arbitrarily long ZLB episode prompts an unbounded boom.
The phase diagrams also pinpoint the origin of the anomalies: they arise because the Euler-
Phillips system is a saddle at the ZLB. In normal times, by contrast, the Euler-Phillips system is
source, so there are no anomalies. In economic terms, the anomalies arise because household
consumption (given by the Euler equation) responds too strongly to the real interest rate. Indeed,
since the only motive for saving is future consumption, households are very forward-looking,
and their response to interest rates is strong.
Once wealth enters the utility function, however, the Euler equation is “discounted”—in the
sense ofMcKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2017)—which alters the properties of the Euler-Phillips
system. People now save partly because they enjoy holding wealth; this is a present consideration,
which does not require them to look into the future. As people are less forward-looking, their
consumption responds less to interest rates; this creates discounting.
With enough marginal utility of wealth, the discounting is strong enough to transform the
Euler-Phillips system from a saddle to a source at the ZLB and thus eliminate all the anomalies.
First, output and ination never collapse at the ZLB: they are bounded below by the ZLB steady
state. Second, when the ZLB episode is long enough, the economy necessarily experiences a
slump, irrespective of the duration of forward guidance. Third, government-spending multipliers
are always nite, irrespective of the duration of the ZLB episode.
Apart from its anomalies, the standard New Keynesian model has several other intriguing
properties at the ZLB—some labeled “paradoxes” because they defy usual economic logic (Eg-
gertsson 2010; Werning 2011; Eggertsson and Krugman 2012). Our model shares these properties.
First, the paradox of thri holds: when households desire to save more than their neighbors,
the economy contracts and they end up saving the same amount as the neighbors. The paradox
of toil also holds: when households desire to work more, the economy contracts and they end
up working less. The paradox of exibility is present too: the economy contracts when prices
become more exible. Last, the government-spending multiplier is above one, so government
spending stimulates private consumption.
2. Justication forWealth in the Utility Function
Before delving into the model, we justify our assumption of wealth in the utility function.
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The standard model assumes that people save to smooth consumption over time, but it has
long been recognized that people seem to enjoy accumulating wealth irrespective of future
consumption. Describing the European upper class of the early 20th century, Keynes (1919,
chap. 2) noted that “The duty of saving became nine-tenths of virtue and the growth of the cake
the object of true religion. . . . Saving was for old age or for your children; but this was only in
theory—the virtue of the cake was that it was never to be consumed, neither by you nor by your
children aer you.” Irving Fisher added that “A man may include in the benets of his wealth
. . . the social standing he thinks it gives him, or political power and inuence, or the mere miserly
sense of possession, or the satisfaction in the mere process of further accumulation” (Fisher
1930, p. 17). Fisher’s perspective is interesting since he developed the theory of saving based on
consumption smoothing.
Neuroscientic evidence conrms that wealth itself provides utility, independently of the
consumption it can buy. Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2005, p. 32) note that “brain-scans
conducted while people win or lose money suggest that money activates similar reward areas
as do other ‘primary reinforcers’ like food and drugs, which implies that money confers direct
utility, rather than simply being valued only for what it can buy.”
Among all the reasons why people may value wealth, we focus on social status: we postu-
late that people enjoy wealth because it provides social status. We therefore introduce relative
(not absolute) wealth into the utility function.2 The assumption is convenient: in equilibrium
everybody is the same, so relative wealth is zero. And the assumption seems plausible. Adam
Smith, Ricardo, John Rae, J.S. Mill, Marshall, Veblen, and Frank Knight all believed that people
accumulate wealth to attain high social status (Steedman 1981). More recently, a broad literature
has documented that people seek to achieve high social status, and that accumulating wealth
is a prevalent pathway to do so (Weiss and Fershtman 1998; Heffetz and Frank 2011; Fiske 2010;
Anderson, Hildreth, and Howland 2015; Cheng and Tracy 2013; Ridgeway 2014; Mattan, Kubota,
and Cloutier 2017).3
2Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992, 1995) develop models in which relative wealth does not directly confer
utility but has other attributes such that people behave as if wealth entered their utility function. In one such model,
wealthier individuals have higher social rankings, which allows them to marry wealthier partners and enjoy higher
utility.
3The wealth-in-the-utility assumption has been found useful in models of long-run growth (Kurz 1968; Konrad
1992; Zou 1994; Corneo and Jeanne 1997; Futagami and Shibata 1998), risk attitudes (Robson 1992; Clemens 2004),
asset pricing (Bakshi and Chen 1996; Gong and Zou 2002; Kamihigashi 2008; Michau, Ono, and Schlegl 2018), life-cycle
consumption (Zou 1995; Carroll 2000; Francis 2009; Straub 2019), social stratication (Long and Shimomura 2004),
international macroeconomics (Fisher 2005; Fisher and Hof 2005), nancial crises (Kumhof, Ranciere, and Winant
2015), and optimal taxation (Saez and Stantcheva 2018). Such usefulness lends further support to the assumption.
3
3. New KeynesianModel withWealth in the Utility Function
We extend the New Keynesian model by assuming that households derive utility not only from
consumption and leisure but also from relative wealth. To simplify derivations and be able to
represent the equilibrium with phase diagrams, we use an alternative formulation of the New
Keynesian model, inspired by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001) andWerning (2011).
Our formulation features continuous time instead of discrete time; self-employed households
instead of rms and households; and Rotemberg (1982) pricing instead of Calvo (1983) pricing.
3.1. Assumptions
The economy is composed of a measure 1 of self-employed households. Each household j ∈ [0, 1]
producesyj(t) units of a good j at time t , sold to other households at a pricepj(t). The household’s
production function is yj(t) = ahj(t), where a > 0 represents the level of technology, and hj(t) is
hours of work. Working causes a disutility κhj(t), where κ > 0 is the marginal disutility of labor.
The goods produced by households are imperfect substitutes for one another, so each house-
hold exercises some monopoly power. Moreover, households face a quadratic cost when they
change their price: changing a price at a rate pij(t) = Ûpj(t)/pj(t) causes a disutility γpij(t)2/2. The
parameter γ > 0 governs the cost to change prices and thus price rigidity.
Each household consumes goods produced by other households. Household j buys quantities
cjk(t) of the goods k ∈ [0, 1]. These quantities are aggregated into a consumption index
cj(t) =
[∫ 1
0
cjk(t)(ϵ−1)/ϵ dk
]ϵ/(ϵ−1)
,
where ϵ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods. The consumption index yields utility
ln(cj(t)). Given the consumption index, the relevant price index is
p(t) =
[∫ 1
0
pj(t)1−ϵ di
] 1/(1−ϵ)
.
When households optimally allocate their consumption expenditure across goods, p(t) is the
price of one unit of consumption index. The ination rate is dened as pi (t) = Ûp(t)/p(t).
Households save using government bonds. Since we postulate that people derive utility from
their relative real wealth, and since bonds are the only store of wealth, holding bonds directly
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provides utility. Formally, holding a nominal quantity of bonds bj(t) yields utility
u
(
bj(t) − b(t)
p(t)
)
.
The functionu : R→ R is increasing and concave, b(t) =
∫ 1
0 bk(t)dk is average nominal wealth,
and [bj(t) − b(t)]/p(t) is household j ’s relative real wealth.
Bonds earn a nominal interest rate ih(t) = i(t) + σ , where i(t) ≥ 0 is the nominal interest
rate set by the central bank, and σ ≥ 0 is a spread between the monetary-policy rate (i(t)) and
the rate used by households for savings decisions (ih(t)). The spread σ captures the efciency of
nancial intermediation (Woodford 2011); the spread is large when nancial intermediation is
severely disrupted, as during the Great Depression and Great Recession. The law of motion of
household j bond holdings is
Ûbj(t) = ih(t)bj(t) + pj(t)yj(t) −
∫ 1
0
pk(t)cjk(t)dk − τ (t).
The term ih(t)bj(t) is interest income; pj(t)yj(t) is labor income;
∫ 1
0 pk(t)cjk(t)dk is consumption
expenditure; and τ (t) is a lump-sum tax (used among other things to service government debt).
Lastly, the problem of household j is to choose time paths for yj(t), pj(t), hj(t), pij(t), cjk(t)
for all k ∈ [0, 1], and bj(t) to maximize the discounted sum of instantaneous utilities∫ ∞
0
e−δt
[
ln(cj(t)) + u
(
bj(t) − b(t)
p(t)
)
− κhj(t) − γ2pij(t)
2
]
dt ,
where δ > 0 is the time discount rate. The household faces four constraints: production function;
law of motion of good j ’s price, Ûpj(t) = pij(t)pj(t); law of motion of bond holdings; and demand
for good j coming from other households’ maximization,
yj(t) =
[
pj(t)
p(t)
]−ϵ
c(t),
where c(t) =
∫ 1
0 ck(t)dk is aggregate consumption. The household also faces a borrowing con-
straint preventing Ponzi schemes. The household takes as given aggregate variables, initial wealth
bj(0), and initial price pj(0). All households face the same initial conditions, so they will behave
the same.
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3.2. Euler Equation and Phillips Curve
The equilibrium is described by a system of two differential equations: an Euler equation and
a Phillips curve. The Euler-Phillips system governs the dynamics of output y(t) and ination
pi (t). Here we present the system; formal and heuristic derivations are in appendices A and B; a
discrete-time version is in appendix C.
The Phillips curve arises from households’ optimal pricing decisions:
Ûpi (t) = δpi (t) − ϵκ
γa
[y(t) − yn] , (1)
where
yn =
ϵ − 1
ϵ
· a
κ
. (2)
The Phillips curve is not modied by wealth in the utility function.
The steady-state Phillips curve, obtained by setting Ûpi = 0 in (1), describes ination as a
linearly increasing function of output:
pi =
ϵκ
δγa
(y − yn) . (3)
We see that yn is the natural level of output: the level at which producers keep their prices
constant.
The Euler equation arises from households’ optimal consumption-savings decisions:
Ûy(t)
y(t) = r (t) − r
n + u′(0) [y(t) − yn] , (4)
where r (t) = i(t) − pi (t) is the real monetary-policy rate and
rn = δ − σ − u′(0)yn . (5)
The marginal utility of wealth,u′(0), enters the Euler equation, so unlike the Phillips curve,
the Euler equation is modied by the wealth-in-the-utility assumption. To understand why
consumption-savings choices are affected by the assumption, we rewrite the Euler equation
as Ûy(t)
y(t) = r
h(t) − δ + u′(0)y(t), (6)
where rh(t) = r (t) + σ is the real interest rate on bonds. In the standard equation, consumption-
savings choices are governed by the nancial returns on wealth, given by rh(t), and the cost
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of delaying consumption, given by δ . Here, people also enjoy holding wealth, so a new term
appears to capture the hedonic returns on wealth: the marginal rate of substitution between
wealth and consumption,u′(0)y(t). In the marginal rate of substitution, the marginal utility of
wealth isu′(0) because in equilibrium all households hold the same wealth so relative wealth is
zero; the marginal utility of consumption is 1/y(t) because consumption utility is log. Thus the
wealth-in-the-utility assumption operates by transforming the rate of return on wealth from rh(t)
to rh(t) + u′(0)y(t).
Because consumption-savings choices depend not only on interest rates but also on the
marginal rate of substitution between wealth and consumption, future interest rates have less
impact on today’s consumption than in the standard model: the Euler equation is discounted.
In fact, the discrete-time version of Euler equation (4) features discounting exactly as in McKay,
Nakamura, and Steinsson (2017) (see appendix C).
The steady-state Euler equation is obtained by setting Ûy = 0 in (4):
u′(0)(y − yn) = rn − r . (7)
The equation describes output as a linearly decreasing function of the real monetary-policy
rate—as in the old-fashioned, Keynesian IS curve. We see that rn is the natural rate of interest:
the real monetary-policy rate at which households consume a quantity yn.
The steady-state Euler equation is deeply affected by the wealth-in-the-utility assumption. To
understand why, we rewrite (7) as
rh + u′(0)y = δ . (8)
The standard steady-state Euler equation boils down to rh = δ . It imposes that the nancial rate
of return on wealth equals the time discount rate—otherwise households would not keep their
consumption constant. With wealth in the utility function, the returns on wealth are not only
nancial but also hedonic. The total rate of return becomes rh+u′(0)y , where the hedonic returns
are measured byu′(0)y . The steady-state Euler equation imposes that the total rate of return on
wealth equals the time discount rate, so it now involves output y . When the real interest rate rh is
higher, people have a nancial incentive to save more and postpone consumption. They keep
consumption constant only if the hedonic returns on wealth fall enough to offset the increase in
nancial returns: this requires output to decline. As a result, with wealth in the utility function,
the steady-state Euler equation describes output as a decreasing function of the real interest
rate—as in the traditional IS curve, but through a different mechanism.
The wealth-in-the-utility assumption adds one parameter to the equilibrium conditions:u′(0).
Accordingly, we compare two submodels:
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Definition 1. The New Keynesian (NK) model has zero marginal utility of wealth:u′(0) = 0. The
wealth-in-the-utility New Keynesian (WUNK) model has sucient marginal utility of wealth:
u′(0) > ϵκ
δγa
. (9)
The NK model is the standard model; the WUNK model is the extension proposed in this
paper.When prices are xed (γ →∞), condition (9) becomesu′(0) > 0; when prices are perfectly
exible (γ = 0), condition (9) becomes u′(0) > ∞. Hence, at the xed-price limit, the WUNK
model only requires an innitesimal marginal utility of wealth; at the exible-price limit, the
WUNKmodel is not well-dened. In the WUNKmodel we also impose δ >
√(ϵ − 1)/γ in order to
accommodate positive natural rates of interest.4
3.3. Natural Rate of Interest andMonetary Policy
The central bank aims to maintain the economy at the natural steady state, where ination is at
zero and output at its natural level.
In normal times, the natural rate of interest is positive, and the central bank is able tomaintain
the economy at the natural steady state using the simple policy rule i(pi (t)) = rn + ϕpi (t). The
corresponding real policy rate is r (pi (t)) = rn + (ϕ − 1)pi (t). The parameter ϕ ≥ 0 governs the
response of interest rates to ination: monetary policy is active when ϕ > 1 and passive when
ϕ < 1.
When the natural rate of interest is negative, however, the natural steady state cannot be
achieved—because this would require the central bank to set a negative nominal policy rate, which
would violate the ZLB. In that case, the central bank moves to the ZLB: i(t) = 0, so r (t) = −pi (t).
What could cause the natural rate of interest to be negative? A rst possibility is a banking
crisis, which disrupts nancial intermediation and raises the interest-rate spread (Woodford 2011;
Eggertsson 2011). The natural rate of interest turns negative when the spread is large enough:
σ > δ − u′(0)yn. Another possibility in the WUNKmodel is drop in consumer sentiment, which
4Indeed, using (2) and (9), we see that in the WUNKmodel
u ′(0)yn
δ
>
1
δ 2
· ϵ − 1
γ
.
This implies that the natural rate of interest, rn = δ [1 − u ′(0)yn/δ ], is bounded above:
rn < δ
[
1 − 1
δ 2
· ϵ − 1
γ
]
.
For the WUNKmodel to accommodate positive natural rates of interest, the upper bound on the natural rate must
be positive, which requires δ >
√(ϵ − 1)/γ .
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leads households to favor saving over consumption, and can be parameterized by an increase
in the marginal utility of wealth. The natural rate of interest turns negative when the marginal
utility is large enough:u′(0) > (δ − σ )/yn.
3.4. Properties of the Euler-Phillips System
We now establish the properties of the Euler-Phillips systems in the NK andWUNKmodels by
constructing their phase diagrams.5 The diagrams are displayed in gure 1.
We begin with the Phillips curve, which gives Ûpi . First, we plot the locus Ûpi = 0, which we label
“Phillips.” The locus is given by the steady-state Phillips curve (3): it is linear, upward sloping, and
goes through the point [y = yn,pi = 0]. Second, we plot the arrows giving the directions of the
trajectories solving the Euler-Phillips system. The sign of Ûpi is given by the Phillips curve (1): any
point above the Phillips line (where Ûpi = 0) has Ûpi > 0, and any point below the line has Ûpi < 0. So
ination is rising above the Phillips line and falling below it.
We next turn to the Euler equation, which gives Ûy . Whereas the Phillips curve is the same in
the NK and WUNKmodels, and in normal times and at the ZLB, the Euler equation is different in
each case. We therefore proceed case by case.
We start with the NK model in normal times and with active monetary policy (panel A). The
Euler equation (4) becomes
Ûy
y
= (ϕ − 1)pi ,
withϕ > 1. The locus Ûy = 0, labeled “Euler,” is simply the horizontal line pi = 0. Since the Phillips
and Euler lines only intersect at the point [y = yn,pi = 0], we conclude that the Euler-Phillips
system admits a unique steady state with zero ination and natural output. Next we examine the
sign of Ûy . As ϕ > 1, any point above the Euler line has Ûy > 0, and any point below the line has
Ûy < 0. Since all the trajectories solving the Euler-Phillips systemmove away from the steady state
in the four quadrants delimited by the Phillips and Euler lines, we conclude that the Euler-Phillips
system is a source.
We then consider the WUNKmodel in normal times with active monetary policy (panel B).
The Euler equation (4) becomes
Ûy
y
= (ϕ − 1)pi + u′(0) (y − yn) ,
5The properties are rederived using an algebraic approach in appendix D.
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A. NKmodel: normal times, active monetary policy B. WUNKmodel: normal times, active monetary policy
C. NKmodel: ZLB D. WUNKmodel: ZLB
Figure 1. Phase Diagrams of the Euler-Phillips System in the NK and WUNKModels
The gure displays phase diagrams for the dynamical system generated by the Euler equation (4) and Phillips curve
(1): y is output; pi is ination; yn is the natural level of output; the Euler line is the locus Ûy = 0; the Phillips line is
the locus Ûpi = 0; the trajectories are solutions to the Euler-Phillips system linearized around its steady state, plotted
for t going from −∞ to +∞. The four panels contrast various cases. The NKmodel is the standard New Keynesian
model. The WUNKmodel is the same model, except that the marginal utility of wealth is not zero but is sufciently
large to satisfy (9). In normal times, the natural rate of interest rn is positive, and the monetary-policy rate is given
by i = rn + ϕpi ; when monetary policy is active, ϕ > 1. At the ZLB, the natural rate of interest is negative, and the
monetary-policy rate is zero. The gure shows that in the NK model, the Euler-Phillips system is a source in normal
times with active monetary policy (panel A); but the system is a saddle at the ZLB (panel C). In the WUNKmodel, by
contrast, the Euler-Phillips system is a source both in normal times and at the ZLB (panels B and D). (Panels A and
B display a nodal source, but the system could also be a spiral source, depending on the value of ϕ; in panel D the
system is always a nodal source.)
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with ϕ > 1. We rst use the Euler equation to compute the Euler line (locus Ûy = 0):
pi = −u
′(0)
ϕ − 1 (y − y
n).
The Euler line is linear, downward sloping (as ϕ > 1), and goes through the point [y = yn,pi = 0].
Since the Phillips and Euler lines only intersect at the point [y = yn,pi = 0], we conclude that the
Euler-Phillips system admits a unique steady state, with zero ination and output at its natural
level. Next we use the Euler equation to determine the sign of Ûy . As ϕ > 1, any point above the
Euler line has Ûy > 0, and any point below it has Ûy < 0. Hence, the solution trajectories move
away from the steady state in all four quadrants of the phase diagram; we conclude that the
Euler-Phillips system is a source. In normal times with active monetary policy, the Euler-Phillips
system therefore behaves similarly in the NK and WUNKmodels.
We next turn to the NK model at the ZLB (panel C). The Euler equation (4) becomes
Ûy
y
= −pi − rn .
Thus the Euler line (locus Ûy = 0) shis up from pi = 0 in normal times to pi = −rn > 0 at the ZLB.
We infer that the Euler-Phillips system admits a unique steady state, where ination is positive
and output is above its natural level. Furthermore, any point above the Euler line has Ûy < 0, and
any point below it has Ûy > 0. As a result, the solution trajectories move toward the steady state in
the southwest and northeast quadrants of the phase diagram, whereas they move away from it in
the southeast and northwest quadrants. We infer that the Euler-Phillips system is a saddle.
We nally move to the WUNKmodel at the ZLB (panel D). The Euler equation (4) becomes
Ûy
y
= −pi − rn + u′(0) (y − yn) .
First, this differential equation implies that the Euler line (locus Ûy = 0) is given by
pi = −rn + u′(0)(y − yn). (10)
So the Euler line is linear, upward sloping, and goes through the point [y = yn + rn/u′(0),pi = 0].
The Euler line has become upward sloping because the real monetary-policy rate, which was
increasing with ination when monetary policy was active, has become decreasing with ination
at the ZLB (r = −pi ). Since rn ≤ 0, the Euler line has shied inward of the point [y = yn,pi = 0],
explaining why the central bank is unable to achieve the natural steady state at the ZLB. And
since the slope of the Euler line is u′(0) while that of the Phillips line is ϵκ/(δγa), the WUNK
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condition (9) ensures that the Euler line is steeper than the Phillips line at the ZLB. From the
Euler and Phillips lines, we infer that the Euler-Phillips system admits a unique steady state, in
which ination is negative and output is below its natural level.6
Second, the differential equation shows that any point above the Euler line has Ûy < 0, and
any point below it has Ûy > 0. Hence, in all four quadrants of the phase diagram, the trajectories
move away from the steady state. We conclude that the Euler-Phillips system is a source. At the
ZLB, the Euler-Phillips system therefore behaves very differently in the NK and WUNKmodels.
With passive monetary policy in normal times, the phase diagrams of the Euler-Phillips
system would be similar to the ZLB phase diagrams—except that the Euler and Phillips lines
would intersect at [y = yn,pi = 0]. In particular, the Euler-Phillips system would be a saddle in
the NK model and a source in the WUNKmodel.
For completeness, we also plot sample solutions to the Euler-Phillips system. The trajectories
are obtained by linearizing the Euler-Phillips system at its steady state.7 When the system is a
source, there are two unstable lines (trajectories thatmove away from the steady state in a straight
line). At t → −∞, all other trajectories are in the vicinity of the steady state and move away
tangentially to one of the unstable lines. At t → +∞, the trajectories move to innity parallel to
the other unstable line. When the system is a saddle, there is one unstable line and one stable
line (trajectory that goes to the steady state in a straight line). All other trajectories come from
innity parallel to the stable line when t → −∞, and move to innity parallel to the unstable
line when t → +∞.
The next propositions summarize the results:
Proposition 1. Consider the Euler-Phillips system in normal times. The system admits a unique
steady state, where output is at its natural level, ination is zero, and the ZLB is not binding. In
the NK model, the system is a source when monetary policy is active but a saddle when monetary
policy is passive. In the WUNK model, the system is a source whether monetary policy is active
or passive.
Proposition 2. Consider the Euler-Phillips system at the ZLB. In the NK model, the system
admits a unique steady state, where output is above its natural level and ination is positive;
furthermore, the system is a saddle. In the WUNKmodel, the system admits a unique steady state,
where output is below its natural level and ination is negative; furthermore, the system is a
source.
6We also check that the intersection of the Euler and Phillips lines has positive output (appendix D).
7Technically the trajectories only approximate the exact solutions; but the approximation is accurate in the
neighborhood of the steady state.
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The propositions give the key difference between the NK and WUNKmodels: at the ZLB, the
Euler-Phillips system remains a source in the WUNKmodel, whereas it becomes a saddle in the
NKmodel. This difference will explain why the WUNKmodel does not suffer from the anomalies
plaguing the NK model at the ZLB. The phase diagrams also illustrate the origin of the WUNK
condition (9). In the WUNKmodel, the Euler-Phillips system remains a source at the ZLB as long
as the Euler line is steeper than the Phillips line (gure 1, panel D). The Euler line’s slope at the
ZLB is the marginal utility of wealth, so that marginal utility is required to be above a certain
level—which is given by (9).
The propositions have implications for equilibrium determinacy. When the Euler-Phillips
system is a source, the equilibrium is determinate: the only equilibrium trajectory in the vicinity
of the steady state is to jump to the steady state and stay there; if the economy jumped somewhere
else, output or ination would diverge following a trajectory similar to those plotted in panels A,
B, and D of gure 1. When the system is a saddle, the equilibrium is indeterminate: any trajectory
jumping somewhere on the saddle path and converging to the steady state is an equilibrium
(gure 1, panel C). Hence, in the NKmodel, the equilibrium is determinate whenmonetary policy
is active but indeterminate when monetary policy is passive and at the ZLB. In the WUNKmodel,
the equilibrium is always determinate, even when monetary policy is passive and at the ZLB.
Accordingly, in the NKmodel, the Taylor principle holds: the central bank must adhere to
an active monetary policy to avoid indeterminacy. From now on, we therefore assume that the
central bank in the NKmodel follows an active policy whenever it can (ϕ > 1 whenever rn > 0).
In the WUNK model, by contrast, indeterminacy is never a risk, so the central bank does not
need to worry about how strongly its policy rate responds to ination. The central bank could
even follow an interest-rate peg without creating indeterminacy.
The results that pertain to the NK model in propositions 1 and 2 are well-known (for example,
Woodford 2001). The results that pertain to theWUNKmodel are close to those obtained by Gabaix
(2016, proposition 3.1), although he does not use our phase-diagram representation. Gabaix nds
that when bounded rationality is strong enough, the Euler-Phillips system is a source even at the
ZLB. He also nds that when prices are more exible, more bounded rationality is required to
maintain the source property. The same is true here: when the marginal utility of wealth is high
enough, such that (9) holds, the Euler-Phillips system is a source even at the ZLB; and when the
price-adjustment cost γ is lower, (9) imposes a higher threshold on the marginal utility of wealth.
Our phase diagrams illustrate the logic behind these results. The Euler-Phillips system remains
a source at the ZLB as long as the Euler line is steeper than the Phillips line (gure 1, panel D).
As the slope of the Euler line is determined by bounded rationality in the Gabaix model and by
marginal utility of wealth in our model, these need to be large enough. When prices are more
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exible, the Phillips line steepens, so the Euler line’s required steepness increases: bounded
rationality or marginal utility of wealth need to be larger.
4. Description and Resolution of the New Keynesian Anomalies
We now describe the anomalous predictions of the NK model at the ZLB: implausibly large drop
in output and ination; and implausibly strong effects of forward guidance and government
spending. We then show that these anomalies are absent from the WUNKmodel.
4.1. Drop in Output and Ination
We consider a temporary ZLB episode, as in Werning (2011). Between times 0 andT > 0, the
natural rate of interest is negative. In response, the central bank maintains its policy rate at
zero. Aer timeT , the natural rate is positive again, and monetary policy returns to normal. This
scenario is summarized in table 1, panel A. We analyze the ZLB episode using the phase diagrams
in gure 2.
We start with the NKmodel. We analyze the ZLB episode by going backward in time. Aer
timeT , monetary policy maintains the economy at the natural steady state. Since equilibrium
trajectories are continuous, the economy also is at the natural steady state at the end of the ZLB,
when t = T .8
We then move back to the ZLB episode, when t < T . At time 0, the economy jumps to the
unique position leading to [y = yn,pi = 0] at timeT . Hence, ination and output initially jump
down to pi (0) < 0 and y(0) < yn, and then recover following the unique trajectory leading to
[y = yn,pi = 0]. The ZLB therefore creates a slump, with below-natural output and deation
(panel A).
Critically, the economy is always on the same trajectory during the ZLB, irrespective of the
ZLB duration T . A longer ZLB only forces output and ination to start from a lower position
on the trajectory at time 0. Thus, as the ZLB lasts longer, initial output and ination collapse to
unboundedly low levels (panel C).
Now let us examine the WUNKmodel. Output and ination never collapse during the ZLB.
Initially ination and output jump down toward the ZLB steady state, denoted [yz,piz], so piz <
pi (0) < 0 and yz < y(0) < yn. They then recover following the trajectory going through [y =
yn,pi = 0]. Consequently the ZLB episode creates a slump (panel B), which is deeper when the
8The trajectories are continuous in output and ination because households have concave preferences over the
two arguments. If consumption had an expected discrete jump, for example, households would be able to increase
their utility by reducing the size of the discontinuity.
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Table 1. ZLB Scenarios
Timeline Natural rate Monetary Government
of interest policy spending
A. ZLB episode
ZLB: t ∈ (0,T ) rn < 0 i = 0 –
Normal times: t > T rn > 0 i = rn + ϕpi –
B. ZLB episode with forward guidance
ZLB: t ∈ (0,T ) rn < 0 i = 0 –
Forward guidance: t ∈ (T ,T + ∆) rn > 0 i = 0 –
Normal times: t > T + ∆ rn > 0 i = rn + ϕpi –
C. ZLB episode with government spending
ZLB: t ∈ (0,T ) rn < 0 i = 0 д > 0
Normal times: t > T rn > 0 i = rn + ϕpi д = 0
This table describes the three scenarios analyzed in section 4: the ZLB episode, in section 4.1; the ZLB episode with
forward guidance, in section 4.2; and the ZLB episode with government spending, in section 4.3. The parameter
T > 0 gives the duration of the ZLB episode; the parameter ∆ > 0 gives the duration of forward guidance. We
assume that monetary policy is active (ϕ > 1) in normal times in the NKmodel; this assumption is required to ensure
equilibrium determinacy (Taylor principle). In the WUNKmodel, monetary policy can be active or passive in normal
times.
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A. NKmodel: short ZLB B. WUNKmodel: short ZLB
C. NKmodel: long ZLB D. WUNKmodel: long ZLB
Figure 2. ZLB Episodes in the NK and WUNKModels
The gure describes various ZLB episodes. The timeline of a ZLB episode is presented in table 1, panel A. Panel A
displays the phase diagram of the NK model’s Euler-Phillips system at the ZLB; it comes from gure 1, panel C. Panel
B displays the phase diagram of the WUNKmodel’s Euler-Phillips system at the ZLB; it comes from gure 1, panel D.
Panels C and D are the same as panels A and B, but with a longer-lasting ZLB (largerT ). The equilibrium trajectories
are the unique trajectories reaching the natural steady state (where pi = 0 and y = yn) at timeT . The gure shows
that the economy slumps during the ZLB: ination is negative and output is below its natural level (panels A and B).
In the NK model, the initial slump becomes unboundedly severe as the ZLB lasts longer (panel C). In the WUNK
model, there is no such collapse: output and ination are bounded below by the ZLB steady state (panel D).
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ZLB lasts longer (panel D). But unlike in the NKmodel, the slump is bounded below by the ZLB
steady state: irrespective of the duration of the ZLB, output and ination remain above yz and piz,
respectively, so they never collapse. Moreover, if the natural rate of interest is negative but close
to zero, such that piz is close to zero and yz to yn, output and ination will barely deviate from
the natural steady state during the ZLB—even if the ZLB lasts a very long time.
The following proposition records these results:9
Proposition 3. Consider a ZLB episode between times 0 and T . The economy enters a slump:
y(t) < yn and pi (t) < 0 for all t ∈ (0,T ). In the NK model, the slump becomes innitely severe
as the ZLB duration approaches innity: limT→∞ y(0) = limT→∞ pi (0) = −∞. In the WUNK
model, in contrast, the slump is bounded below by the ZLB steady state [yz,piz]: y(t) > yz and
pi (t) > piz for all t ∈ (0,T ). In fact, the slump approaches the ZLB steady state as the ZLB duration
approaches innity: limT→∞ y(0) = yz and limT→∞ pi (0) = piz .
In the NKmodel, output and ination collapse when the ZLB is long-lasting, which is well-
known (Eggertsson andWoodford 2004, g. 1; Eggertsson 2011, g. 1; Werning 2011, proposition 1).
This collapse is difcult to reconcile with real-world observations. The ZLB episode that started in
1995 in Japan lasted for more than twenty years without sustained deation. The ZLB episode that
started in 2009 in the euro area lasted for more than 10 years; it did not yield sustained deation
either. The same is true of the ZLB episode that occurred in the United States between 2008 and
2015.
In the WUNKmodel, in contrast, ination and output never collapse. Instead, as the duration
of the ZLB increases, the economy converges to the ZLB steady state. That ZLB steady state may
not be far from the natural steady state: if the natural rate of interest is only slightly negative,
ination is only slightly below zero and output only slightly below its natural level. Gabaix (2016,
proposition 3.2) obtains a closely related result: in his model output and ination also converge
to the ZLB steady state when the ZLB is arbitrarily long.
4.2. Forward Guidance
We turn to the effects of forward guidance at the ZLB. We consider a three-stage scenario, as in
Cochrane (2017). Between times 0 andT , there is a ZLB episode. To alleviate the situation, the
central bank makes a forward-guidance promise at time 0: that it will maintain the policy rate at
zero for a duration ∆ once the ZLB is over. Aer timeT , the natural rate of interest is positive
9The result that in the NKmodel output becomes innitely negative when the ZLB becomes innitely long should
not be interpreted literally. It is obtained because we omitted the constraint that output must remain positive. The
proper interpretation is that output falls much, much below its natural level—in fact it converges to zero.
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again. Between timesT andT + ∆, the central bank fullls its forward-guidance promise and
keeps the policy rate at zero. Aer timeT + ∆, monetary policy returns to normal. This scenario
is summarized in table 1, panel B.
We analyze the ZLB episode with forward guidance using the phase diagrams in gures 3 and
4. The forward-guidance diagrams are based on the ZLB diagrams in gure 1. In the NKmodel
(gure 3, panel A), the diagram is the same as in panel C of gure 1, except that the Euler line
pi = −rn is lower because rn > 0 instead of rn < 0. In the WUNKmodel (gure 4, panel A), the
diagram is the same as in panel D of gure 1, except that the Euler line (10) is shied outward
because rn > 0 instead of rn < 0.
We begin with the NK model (gure 3). We go backward in time. Aer timeT + ∆, monetary
policymaintains the economy at the natural steady state. Between timesT andT +∆, the economy
is in forward guidance (panel A). Following the logic of gure 2, we nd that at timeT , ination
is positive and output above its natural level. They subsequently decrease over time, following
the unique trajectory leading to the natural steady state at timeT + ∆. Accordingly, the economy
booms during forward guidance. Furthermore, as forward guidance lengthens, ination and
output at timeT become higher.
We look next at the ZLB episode, between times 0 andT . Since equilibrium trajectories are
continuous, the economy is at the same point at the end of the ZLB and at the beginning of forward
guidance. The boom engineered during forward guidance therefore improves the situation at the
ZLB. Instead of reaching the natural steady state at timeT , the economy reaches a point with
positive ination and above-natural output, so at any time beforeT , ination and output tend to
be higher than without forward guidance (panel B).
Forward guidance can actually have tremendously strong effects in the NK model. For small
durations of forward guidance, the position at timeT is below the ZLB unstable line. It is therefore
connected to trajectories coming from the southwest quadrant of the phase diagram (panel B). As
the ZLB lasts longer, initial output and ination collapse. When the duration of forward guidance
is such that the position at timeT is exactly on the unstable line, the position at time 0 is on the
unstable line as well (panel C). As the ZLB lasts longer, the initial position inches closer to the
ZLB steady state. For even longer forward guidance, the position at timeT is above the unstable
line, so it is connected to trajectories coming from the northeast quadrant (panel D). Then, as
the ZLB lasts longer, initial output and ination become higher and higher. As a result, if the
duration of forward guidance is long enough, a deep slump can be transformed into a roaring
boom. Moreover, the forward-guidance duration threshold is independent of the ZLB duration.
In comparison, the power of forward guidance is subdued in the WUNK model (gure 4).
Between timesT andT + ∆, forward guidance operates (panel A). Ination is positive and output
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A. Forward guidance B. ZLB with short forward guidance
C. ZLB with medium forward guidance D. ZLB with long forward guidance
Figure 3. NKModel: ZLB Episodes with Forward Guidance
The gure describes various ZLB episodes with forward guidance in the NK model. The timeline of such episode is
presented in table 1, panel B. Panel A displays the phase diagram of the NKmodel’s Euler-Phillips system during
forward guidance; it is similar to the diagram in gure 1, panel C but with rn > 0. The equilibrium trajectory during
forward guidance is the unique trajectory reaching the natural steady state at timeT + ∆. Panels B, C, and D display
the phase diagram of the NK model’s Euler-Phillips system at the ZLB; they comes from gure 1, panel C. The
equilibrium trajectory at the ZLB is the unique trajectory reaching the point determined by forward guidance at time
T . Panels B, C, and D differ in the underlying duration of forward guidance (∆): short in panel B, medium in panel C,
and long in panel D. The gure shows that the NK model suffers from an anomaly: when forward guidance lasts
sufciently to bring [y(T ),pi (T )] above the unstable line, any ZLB episode—however long—triggers a boom (panel D).
On the other hand, if forward guidance is short enough to keep [y(T ),pi (T )] below the unstable line, long-enough
ZLB episodes are slumps (panel B). In the knife-edge case where [y(T ),pi (T )] falls just on the unstable line, arbitrarily
long ZLB episodes converge to the ZLB steady state (panel C).
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A. Forward guidance B. Short ZLB with forward guidance
C. Long ZLB with forward guidance D. Possible trajectories
Figure 4. WUNKModel: ZLB Episodes with Forward Guidance
The gure describes various ZLB episodes with forward guidance in the WUNKmodel. The timeline of such episode
is presented in table 1, panel B. Panel A displays the phase diagram of theWUNKmodel’s Euler-Phillips system during
forward guidance; it is similar to the diagram in gure 1, panel D but with rn > 0. The equilibrium trajectory during
forward guidance is the unique trajectory reaching the natural steady state at timeT + ∆. Panel B displays the phase
diagram of the WUNKmodel’s Euler-Phillips system at the ZLB; it comes from gure 1, panel D. The equilibrium
trajectory at the ZLB is the unique trajectory reaching the point determined by forward guidance at timeT . Panel C
is the same as panel B, but with a longer-lasting ZLB (largerT ). Panel D is a generic version of panels A, B, and C,
describing any duration of ZLB and forward guidance. The gure shows that the NK model’s anomaly disappears in
the WUNKmodel: a long-enough ZLB episode prompts a slump irrespective of the duration of forward guidance
(panel C).
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is above its natural level at timeT . They then decrease over time, following the trajectory leading
to the natural steady state at time T + ∆. The economy booms during forward guidance; but
unlike in the NK model, output and ination are bounded above by the forward-guidance steady
state.
Before forward guidance comes the ZLB episode (panels B and C). Thanks to the boom
engineered by forward guidance, the situation is improved at the ZLB: ination and output tend
to be higher than without forward guidance. Yet, unlike in the NK model, output during the ZLB
episode is always below its level at time T , so forward guidance cannot generate unbounded
booms (panel D). The ZLB cannot generate unbounded slumps either, since output and ination
are bounded below by the ZLB steady state (panel D). Actually, for any forward-guidance duration,
as the ZLB lasts longer, the economy converges to the ZLB steady state at time 0. The implication
is that forward guidance can never prevent a slump when the ZLB lasts long enough.
Based on these dynamics, we identify an anomaly in the NK model, which is resolved in the
WUNKmodel (proof details in appendix D):
Proposition 4. Consider a ZLB episode during (0,T ) followed by forward guidance during (T ,T+
∆).
• In the NK model, there exists a threshold ∆∗ such that a forward guidance longer than ∆∗
transforms a ZLB episode of any duration into a boom: let ∆ > ∆∗; for any T and for all
t ∈ (0,T + ∆), y(t) > yn and pi (t) > 0. In addition, when forward guidance is longer than ∆∗,
a long-enough forward guidance or ZLB episode generates an arbitrarily large boom: for any
T , lim∆→∞ y(0) = lim∆→∞ pi (0) = +∞; and for any ∆ > ∆∗, limT→∞ y(0) = limT→∞ pi (0) =
+∞.
• In the WUNK model, in contrast, there exists a threshold T ∗ such that a ZLB episode longer
than T ∗ prompts a slump, irrespective of the duration of forward guidance: let T > T ∗; for
any ∆, y(0) < yn and pi (0) < 0. Furthermore, the slump approaches the ZLB steady state as
the ZLB duration approaches innity: for any ∆, limT→∞ y(0) = yz and limT→∞ pi (0) = piz .
In addition, the economy is bounded above by the forward-guidance steady state [y f ,pi f ]: for
any T and ∆, and for all t ∈ (0,T + ∆), y(t) < y f and pi (t) < pi f .
The anomaly identied in the proposition corresponds to the forward-guidance puzzle de-
scribed by Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2015, g. 1) and Cochrane (2017, g. 6).10 These papers
also nd that a long-enough forward guidance transforms a ZLB slump into a boom.
10In the literature the forward-guidance puzzle takes several forms. The common element is that future monetary
policy has an implausibly strong effect on current output and ination.
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In theWUNKmodel, this anomalous pattern vanishes. In theNewKeynesianmodels byGabaix
(2016), Diba and Loisel (2019), Acharya and Dogra (2019), and Bilbiie (2019), forward guidance
also has more subdued effects than in the standard model. Besides, New Keynesian models have
been developed with the sole goal of solving the forward-guidance puzzle. Among these, ours
belongs to the group that uses discounted Euler equations.11 For example, Del Negro, Giannoni,
and Patterson (2015) generate discounting from overlapping generations; McKay, Nakamura, and
Steinsson (2016) from heterogeneous agents facing borrowing constraints and cyclical income
risk; Angeletos and Lian (2018) from incomplete information; and Campbell et al. (2017) from
government bonds in the utility function (which is closely related to our approach).
4.3. Government Spending
Last we consider the effects of government spending at the ZLB. We rst extend the model
by assuming that the government purchases goods from all households, which are aggregated
into public consumption д(t). To ensure that government spending affects ination and private
consumption, we also assume that the disutility of labor is convex: household j incurs disutility
κ1+ηhj(t)1+η/(1 + η) from working, where η > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. Complete
extended model, derivations, and results are presented in appendix E.
In this model, the Euler equation is unchanged, but the Phillips curve is modied because
the marginal disutility of labor is not constant, and because households produce goods for the
government. The modication of the Phillips curve alters the analysis in three ways.
First, the steady-state Phillips curve becomes nonlinear, which may introduce additional
steady states. We handle this issue as in the literature: we linearize the Euler-Phillips system
around the natural steady state without government spending, and concentrate on the dynamics
of the linearized system. These dynamics are described by phase diagrams similar to those in the
basic model.
Second, the slope of the steady-state Phillips curve is modied, so the WUNK assumption
needs to be adjusted. Instead of (3), the linearized steady-state Phillips curve is
pi = − ϵκ
δγa
(
ϵ − 1
ϵ
)η/(1+η)
[(1 + η)(c − cn) + ηд] . (11)
The WUNK assumption guarantees that at the ZLB, the steady-state Euler equation (with slope
u′(0)) is steeper than the steady-state Phillips curve (now given by (11)). Hence, we need to replace
11Other approaches to solve the forward-guidance puzzle include modifying the Phillips curve (Carlstrom, Fuerst,
and Paustian 2015), combining reective expectations and temporary equilibrium (Garcia-Schmidt and Woodford
2019), combining bounded rationality and incomplete markets (Farhi and Werning 2019), and introducing an
endogenous liquidity premium (Bredemeier, Kaufmann, and Schabert 2018).
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assumption (9) by
u′(0) > (1 + η) ϵκ
δγa
(
ϵ − 1
ϵ
)η/(1+η)
. (12)
Naturally, for η = 0, this assumption reduces to (9).
Third, public consumption enters the Phillips curve, so government spending operates
through that curve. Indeed, since η > 0 in (11), government spending shis the steady-state
Phillips curve upward. Intuitively, given private consumption, an increase in government spend-
ing raises production and thus marginal costs. Facing higher marginal costs, producers augment
ination.
We now study a ZLB episode during which the government increases spending in an effort to
stimulate the economy, as in Cochrane (2017). Between times 0 andT , there is a ZLB episode. To
alleviate the situation, the government provides an amount д > 0 of public consumption. Aer
timeT , the natural rate of interest is positive again, government spending stops, and monetary
policy returns to normal. This scenario is summarized in table 1, panel C.
We start with the NKmodel (gure 5).12 We construct the equilibrium path by going backward
in time. At timeT , monetary policy brings the economy to the natural steady state. At the ZLB,
government spending helps, but through a different mechanism than forward guidance. Forward
guidance improves the situation at the end of the ZLB, which pulls up the economy during the
entire ZLB. Government spending leaves the end of the ZLB unchanged: the economy reaches
the natural steady state. Instead, government spending shis the Phillips line upward, and with
it, the eld of trajectories. As a result, the natural steady state is connected to trajectories with
higher consumption and ination, which improves the situation during the entire ZLB (panel A
versus panel B).
Just like forward guidance, government spending can have very strong effects in the NK
model. When spending is low, the natural steady state is below the ZLB unstable line (panel B). It
is therefore connected to trajectories coming from the southwest quadrant of the phase diagram—
just as without government spending (panel A). Then, if the ZLB lasts longer, initial consumption
and ination fall lower. When spending is high enough that the unstable line crosses the natural
steady state, the economy is also on the unstable line at time 0 (panel C). Finally, when spending
is even higher, the natural steady state moves above the unstable line, so it is connected to
trajectories coming from the northeast quadrant (panel D). As a result, initial output and ination
are higher than previously. And as the ZLB lasts longer, initial output and ination become even
higher, without bound.
12There is a small differencewith the phase diagrams of the basicmodel: private consumption c is on the horizontal
axis instead of output y . But y = c in the basic model (government spending is zero), so the phase diagrams with
private consumption on the horizontal axis would be the same as those with output.
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A. ZLB with no government spending B. ZLB with low government spending
C. ZLB with medium government spending D. ZLB with high government spending
Figure 5. NKModel: ZLB Episodes with Government Spending
The gure describes various ZLB episodes with government spending in the NKmodel. The timeline of such episode
is presented in table 1, panel C. The panels display the phase diagrams of the linearized Euler-Phillips system for
the NKmodel with government spending and convex disutility of labor at the ZLB: c is private consumption; pi is
ination; cn is the natural level of private consumption; the Euler line is the locus Ûc = 0; the Phillips line is the locus
Ûpi = 0. The phase diagrams have the same properties as that in gure 1, panel C, except that the Phillips line shis
upward when government spending increases (see equation (11)). The equilibrium trajectory at the ZLB is the unique
trajectory reaching the natural steady state at timeT . The four panels feature an increasing amount of government
spending (д), starting from д = 0 in panel A. The gure shows that the NKmodel suffers from an anomaly: when
government spending brings down the unstable line from above to below the natural steady state, an arbitrarily long
ZLB episode sees an arbitrarily large increase in output, which triggers an unboundedly large boom (from panel B
to panel D). On the other hand, if government spending is low enough to keep the unstable line above the natural
steady state, long-enough ZLB episodes are slumps (panel B). In the knife-edge case where the natural steady state
falls just on the unstable line, arbitrarily long ZLB episodes converge to the ZLB steady state (panel C).
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A. ZLB with no government spending B. ZLB with low government spending
C. ZLB with medium government spending D. ZLB with high government spending
Figure 6. WUNKModel: ZLB Episodes with Government Spending
The gure describes various ZLB episodes with government spending in the WUNKmodel. The timeline of such
episode is presented in table 1, panel C. The panels display the phase diagrams of the linearized Euler-Phillips system
for the WUNKmodel with government spending and convex disutility of labor at the ZLB: c is private consumption;
pi is ination; cn is the natural level of private consumption; the Euler line is the locus Ûc = 0; the Phillips line is the
locus Ûpi = 0. The phase diagrams have the same properties as that in gure 1, panel D, except that the Phillips line
shis upward when government spending increases (see equation (11)). The equilibrium trajectory at the ZLB is
the unique trajectory reaching the natural steady state at timeT . The four panels feature an increasing amount of
government spending (д), starting from д = 0 in panel A. The gure shows that the NK model’s anomaly disappears
in the WUNKmodel: the government-spending multiplier is nite when the ZLB becomes arbitrarily long-lasting;
and equilibrium trajectories are bounded irrespective of the duration of the ZLB.
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The power of government spending at the ZLB is much weaker in the WUNKmodel (gure 6).
Government spending does improves the situation at the ZLB, as ination and consumption tend
to be higher than without spending. But as the ZLB lasts longer, the position at the beginning of
the ZLB converges to the ZLB steady state—unlike in the NK model, it does not go to innity. So
equilibrium trajectories are bounded, and government spending cannot generate unbounded
booms.
Based on these dynamics, we isolate another anomaly in the NK model, which is resolved in
the WUNKmodel (proof details in appendix F):
Proposition 5. Consider a ZLB episode during (0,T ), accompanied by government spending
д > 0. Let c(t ;д) and y(t ;д) be private consumption and output at time t ; let s > 0 be some
incremental government spending; and let
m(д, s) = y(0;д + s/2) − y(0;д − s/2)
s
= 1 +
c(0;д + s/2) − c(0;д − s/2)
s
be the government-spending multiplier.
• In the NK model, there exists a government spending д∗ such that the government-spending
multiplier becomes innitely large when the ZLB duration approaches innity: for any s > 0,
limT→∞m(д∗, s) = +∞. In addition, when government spending is above д∗, a long-enough
ZLB episode generates an arbitrarily large boom: for any д > д∗, limT→∞ c(0;д) = +∞.
• In the WUNK model, in contrast, the multiplier has a nite limit when the ZLB duration
approaches innity: for any д and s , when T →∞,m(д, s) converges to
1 +
η
u ′(0)δγa
ϵκ ·
( ϵ
ϵ−1
)η/(1+η) − (1 + η) . (13)
Moreover, the economy is bounded above for any ZLB duration: let cд be private consumption
in the ZLB steady state with government spending д; for anyT and for all t ∈ (0,T ), c(t ;д) <
max(cд, cn).
The anomaly that a nite amount of government spending may generate an innitely large
boom as the ZLB becomes arbitrarily long-lasting is reminiscent of the ndings by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011, g. 2), Woodford (2011, g. 2), and Cochrane (2017, g. 5). They
nd that in the NKmodel government spending is exceedingly powerful when the ZLB is long-
lasting.
In the WUNKmodel, this anomaly vanishes. Diba and Loisel (2019) and Acharya and Dogra
(2019) also obtain more realistic effects of government spending at the ZLB. In addition, Brede-
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meier, Juessen, and Schabert (2018) obtain moderate multipliers at the ZLB by introducing an
endogenous liquidity premium in the New Keynesian model.
5. Other New Keynesian Properties at the ZLB
Beside the anomalous properties described in section 4, the New Keynesian model has sev-
eral other intriguing properties at the ZLB: the paradoxes of thri, toil, and exibility; and a
government-spending multiplier greater than one. We now show that the WUNKmodel shares
these properties.
In the NK model these properties are studied in the context of a temporary ZLB episode. An
advantage of the WUNKmodel is that we can simply work with a permanent ZLB episode. We
assume that the natural rate of interest is permanently negative, and the central bank keeps the
policy rate at zero forever. The only equilibrium is at the ZLB steady state, where the economy
is in a slump: ination is negative and output is below its natural level. The ZLB equilibrium is
represented in gure 7: it is the intersection of a Phillips line, describing the steady-state Phillips
curve, and an Euler line, describing the steady-state Euler equation. When an unexpected and
permanent shock occurs, the economy jumps to a new ZLB steady state; we use the graphs to
study such jumps.
5.1. Paradox of Thri
We rst study an increase in the marginal utility of wealth (u′(0)). The steady-state Phillips curve
is unaffected, but the steady-state Euler equation changes. Using (5), we rewrite the steady-state
Euler equation (10):
pi = −δ + σ + u′(0)y .
Increasing the marginal utility of wealth steepens the Euler line, which moves the economy
inward along the Phillips line. Output and ination therefore decrease (gure 7, panel A). The
following proposition gives the results:
Proposition 6. At the ZLB in the WUNK model, the paradox of thrift holds: an unexpected and
permanent increase in the marginal utility of wealth reduces output and ination but does not
aect relative wealth.
The paradox of thri was rst discussed by Keynes, but it also appears in the New Keynesian
model (Eggertsson 2010, p. 16; Eggertsson and Krugman 2012, p. 1486). When the marginal utility
of wealth is higher, people want to increase their wealth holdings relative to their peers, so
they favor saving over consumption. But in equilibrium, relative wealth is xed at zero because
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everybody is the same; the only way to increase saving relative to consumption is to reduce
consumption. In normal times, the central bank would offset this drop in aggregate demand by
reducing nominal interest rates. This is not an option at the ZLB, so output falls.
5.2. Paradox of Toil
Next we consider a reduction in the disutility of labor (κ). In this case, the steady-state Phillips
curve changeswhile the steady-state Euler equation does not. Using (2), we rewrite the steady-state
Phillips curve (3):
pi =
ϵκ
δγa
y − ϵ − 1
δγ
.
Reducing the disutility of labor attens the Phillips line, which moves the economy inward along
the Euler line. Thus, both output and ination decrease (gure 7, panel B). Since hours worked
and output are related by h = y/a, hours fall as well. The following proposition states the results:
Proposition 7. At the ZLB in the WUNK model, the paradox of toil holds: an unexpected and
permanent reduction in the disutility of labor reduces output, ination, and hours worked.
The paradox of toil was discovered by Eggertsson (2010, p. 15) and Eggertsson and Krugman
(2012, p. 1487). It operates as follows. With lower disutility of labor, real marginal costs are lower,
and the natural level of output is higher: producers would like to sell more. To increase sales,
they reduce their prices by reducing ination. At the ZLB, nominal interest rates are xed, so the
decrease in ination raises real interest rates—which renders households more prone to save. In
equilibrium, this lowers output and hours worked.13
5.3. Paradox of Flexibility
We then examine a decrease in the price-adjustment cost (γ ). The steady-state Euler equation
is not affected, but the steady-state Phillips curve is. Equation (3) shows that decreasing the
price-adjustment cost leads to a counterclockwise rotation of the Phillips line around the natural
steady state. This moves the economy downward along the Euler line, so output and ination
decrease (gure 7, panel C). The following proposition records the results:
Proposition 8. At the ZLB in the WUNK model, the paradox of exibility holds: an unexpected
and permanent decrease in price-adjustment cost reduces output and ination.
13An increase in technology (a) would have the same effect as a reduction in the disutility of labor: it would lower
output, ination, and hours.
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A. Paradox of thri B. Paradox of toil
C. Paradox of exibility D. Above-one government-spending multiplier
Figure 7. WUNKmodel: Other Properties at the ZLB
The gure describes four comparative statics of the WUNKmodel at the ZLB. In panels A, B, and C, the Euler and
Phillips lines are the same as in gure 1, panel D. In panel D, the Euler and Phillips lines are the same as in gure 6.
The ZLB equilibrium is at the intersection of the Euler and Phillips lines: output/consumption is below its natural
level and ination is negative. Panel A illustrates the paradox of thri: increasing the marginal utility of wealth
steepens the Euler line, which depresses output and ination without changing relative wealth. Panel B illustrates
the paradox of toil: reducing the disutility of labor moves the Phillips line outward, which depresses output, ination,
and hours worked. Panel C illustrates the paradox of exibility: decreasing the price-adjustment cost rotates the
Phillips line counterclockwise around the natural steady state, which depresses output and ination. Panel D shows
that the government-spending multiplier is above one: increasing government spending shis the Phillips line
upward, which raises private consumption and therefore increases output more than one-for-one.
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The paradox of exibility was discovered by Werning (2011, pp. 13–14) and Eggertsson and
Krugman (2012, pp. 1487–1488). Intuitively, with a lower price-adjustment cost, producers are
keener to adjust their prices to bring production closer to the natural level of output. Since
production is below the natural level at the ZLB, producers are keener to reduce their prices to
stimulate sales. This accentuates the existing deation, which translates into higher real interest
rates. As a result, households are more prone to save, which in equilibrium depresses output.
5.4. Above-One Government-SpendingMultiplier
We nally look at an increase in government spending (д), using the model with government
spending introduced in section 4.3. From (11) we see that increasing government spending shis
the Phillips line upward, which moves the economy upward along the Euler line: both private
consumption and ination increase (gure 7, panel D). Since private consumption increases when
public consumption does, the government-spending multiplier dy/dд = 1 + dc/dд is greater
than one. The ensuing proposition gives the results (proof details in appendix F):
Proposition 9. At the ZLB in the WUNK model, an unexpected and permanent increase in gov-
ernment spending raises private consumption and ination. Hence the government-spending mul-
tiplier dy/dд is above one; its value is given by (13).
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), Eggertsson (2011), andWoodford (2011) also show
that at the ZLB in the New Keynesian model, the government-spending multiplier is above one.
The intuition is the following. With higher government spending, real marginal costs are higher
for a given level of sales to households. Producers pass the cost increase through into prices,
which raises ination. At the ZLB, the increase in ination lowers real interest rates—as nominal
interest rates are xed—which deters households from saving. In equilibrium, this leads to higher
private consumption and a multiplier above one.
6. Empirical Assessment of theWUNK Assumption
In the WUNKmodel, the marginal utility of wealth is assumed to be high enough that the steady-
state Euler equation is steeper than the steady-state Phillips curve at the ZLB. We assess this
assumption using US evidence.
As a rst step, we re-express theWUNK assumption in terms of estimable statistics. We obtain
the following condition (derivations in appendix G):
δ − rn > λ
δ
, (14)
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where δ is the time discount rate, rn is the average natural rate of interest, and λ is the coefcient
on output gap in a New Keynesian Phillips curve. The term δ − rn measures the marginal rate
of substitution between wealth and consumption, u′(0)yn. It indicates how high the marginal
utility of wealth is and thus how steep the steady-state Euler equation is at the ZLB. The term
λ/δ indicates how steep the steady-state Phillips curve is. The δ comes from the denominator
of the slopes of the Phillips curves (3) and (11); the λmeasures the rest of the slope coefcients.
Condition (14) is expressed in terms of sufcient statistics, so it applies both when the disutility
of labor is linear (in which case it is equivalent to (9)) and when the disutility of labor is convex
(in which case it is equivalent to (12)). We now survey the literature to obtain estimates of rn, λ,
and δ .
6.1. Natural Rate of Interest
A large number of macroeconometric studies have estimated the natural rate of interest, using
different statistical models, methodologies, and data. Recent studies obtain comparable estimates
of the natural rate for the United States: around 2% per annum on average between 1985 and 2015
(Williams 2017, g. 1). Accordingly, we use rn = 2% as our estimate.
6.2. Output-Gap Coefcient in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Many studies have estimated New Keynesian Phillips curves. Mavroeidis, Plagborg-Moller, and
Stock (2014, sec. 5) offer a synthesis for the United States. They generate estimates of the New
Keynesian Phillips curve using an array of US data, methods, and specications found in the
literature. They nd signicant uncertainty around the estimates, but in many cases the output-
gap coefcient is positive and very small. Overall, their median estimate of the output-gap
coefcient is λ = 0.004 (table 5, row 1), which we use as our estimate.
6.3. Time Discount Rate
Since the 1970s, many studies have estimated time discount rates using eld and laboratory
experiments and real-world behavior. Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002, table 1)
survey 43 such studies. The estimates are quite dispersed, but the majority of them points to
high discount rates, much higher than prevailing market interest rates. We compute the mean
estimate in each of the studies covered by the survey, and then compute the median value of
these means. We obtain an annual discount rate of δ = 35%.
There is one immediate limitation with the studies discussed by Frederick, Loewenstein,
and O’Donoghue: they use a single rate to exponentially discount future utility. But exponential
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discounting does not describe reality well because people seem to choosemore impatiently for the
present than for the future—they exhibit present-focused preferences (Ericson and Laibson 2019).
Recent studies have moved away from exponential discounting and allowed for present-focused
preferences, including quasi-hyperbolic (β -δ ) discounting. Andersen et al. (2014, table 3) survey
16 such studies, concentrating on experimental studies with real incentives. We compute the
mean estimate in each study and then the median value of these means; we obtain an annual
discount rate of δ = 43%. Accordingly, even aer accounting for present-focus, time discounting
remains high. We use δ = 43% as our estimate.14
6.4. Assessment
Wenowcombine our estimates ofrn,λ, andδ to assess theWUNKassumption. Sinceλ is estimated
using quarters as units of time, we re-express rn and δ as quarterly rates: rn = 2%/4 = 0.5%
per quarter, and δ = 43%/4 = 10.8% per quarter. We conclude that (14) comfortably holds:
δ − rn = 0.108 − 0.005 = 0.103, which is much larger than λ/δ = 0.004/0.108 = 0.037. Hence the
WUNK assumption holds in US data.
The discount rate used here (43% per annum) is much higher than discount rates used in
macroeconomic models (typically less than 5% per annum). This is because our discount rate is
calibrated frommicroevidence, while the discount rate in macroeconomic models is calibrated
to match observed real interest rates.
This discrepancy occasions two remarks. First, the wealth-in-the-utility assumption is ad-
vantageous because it accords with the fact that people exhibit double-digit time discount rates
and yet are willing to save at single-digit interest rates. In the standard model, by contrast, the
discount rate necessarily equals the real interest rate in steady state, so the model cannot have
δ  5%.
14There are two potential issues with the experiments discussed in Andersen et al. (2014). First, many are run
with university students instead of subjects representative of the general population. There does not seem to be
systematic differences in discounting between student and non-student subjects, however (Cohen et al. 2019, sec. 6A).
Hence, using students is unlikely to bias the estimates reported by Andersen et al.. Second, all the experiments elicit
discount rates using nancial ows, not consumption ows. As the goal is to elicit the discount rate on consumption,
this could be problematic (Cohen et al. 2019, sec. 4B); the problems could be exacerbated if subjects derive utility
from wealth. To assess this potential issue, suppose rst (as in most of the literature) that monetary payments are
consumed at the time of receipt, and that the utility function is locally linear. Then the experiments deliver estimates
of the relevant discount rate (Cohen et al. 2019, sec. 4B). If these conditions do not hold, the experimental ndings
are more difcult to interpret. For instance, if subjects optimally smooth their consumption over time by borrowing
and saving, then the experiments only elicit the interest rate faced by subjects, and reveal nothing about their
discount rate (Cohen et al. 2019, sec. 4B). In that case, we should rely on experiments using time-dated consumption
rewards instead of monetary rewards. Such experiments directly deliver estimates of the discount rate. Many such
experiments have been conducted; a robust nding is that discount rates are systematically higher for consumption
rewards than for monetary rewards (Cohen et al. 2019, sec. 3A). Hence, the estimates presented in Andersen et al.
are, if anything, lower bounds on actual discount rates.
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Second, the WUNK assumption would also hold with discount rates below 43%. Indeed, (14)
holds for discount rates as low as 27% because δ − rn = (0.27/4) − 0.005 = 0.062 is greater than
λ/δ = 0.004/(0.27/4) = 0.059. An annual discount rate of 27% is at the low end of available
microestimates: in 11 of the 16 studies in Andersen et al. (2014, table 3), the bottom of the estimate
range is above 27%; and in 13 of the 16 studies, the mean estimate is above 27%.
Finally, while our model omits rms and assumes that households are both producers and
consumers, in reality rms and households are oen separate entities that could have different
discount rates. With different discount rates, (14) would become
δh − rn > λ
δ f
,
where δh is households’ discount rate and δ f is rms’ discount rate. Clearly, if rms have a
low discount rate, the WUNK assumption is less likely to be satised. If we use δh = 43%,
rn = 2%, and λ = 0.004, we nd that the WUNK condition holds as long as rms have an
annual discount rate above 16% because δh − rn = (0.43/4) − 0.005 = 0.103 is greater than
λ/δ f = 0.004/(0.16/4) = 0.100. A discount rate of 16% is only slightly above that reported by
large US rms: in a survey of 228 CEOs, Poterba and Summers (1995) nd an average annual real
discount rate of 12.2%; and in a survey of 86 CFOs, Jagannathan et al. (2016, p. 447) nd an average
annual real discount rate of 12.7%.
7. Conclusion
This paper proposes an extension of the New Keynesian model that is immune to the anomalies
that plague the standard model at the ZLB. The extended model deviates only minimally from
the standard model: relative wealth enters the utility function, which only adds an extra term
in the Euler equation. Yet, when the marginal utility of wealth is sufciently high, the model
behaves well at the ZLB: even when the ZLB is long-lasting, there is no collapse of ination and
output, and both forward guidance and government spending have limited, plausible effects. The
extended model also retains other properties of the standard model at the ZLB: the paradoxes of
thri, toil, and exibility; and a government-spending multiplier greater than one.
Our analysis would apply more generally to any New Keynesian model representable by a
discounted Euler equation and a Phillips curve (for example, Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson
2015; Gabaix 2016; McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson 2017; Campbell et al. 2017; Beaudry and
Portier 2018; Angeletos and Lian 2018). Wealth in the utility function is a simple way to generate
discounting; but any model with discounting would have similar phase diagrams and properties.
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Hence, for suchmodels to behave well at the ZLB, there is only one requirement: that discounting
is strong enough to make the steady-state Euler equation steeper than the steady-state Phillips
curve at the ZLB; the source of discounting is unimportant. In the real world, several discounting
mechanisms might operate at the same time and reinforce each other. A model blending these
mechanisms would be even more likely to behave well at the ZLB.
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Appendix A. Formal derivation of Euler equation & Phillips curve
We derive the two differential equations that describe the equilibrium of the New Keynesian
model with wealth in the utility function: the Phillips curve, given by (1); and the Euler equation,
given by (4).
A.1. Household’s problem
We begin by solving household j ’s problem. The current-value Hamiltonian of the problem is
Hj = ϵ
ϵ − 1 ln
(∫ 1
0
cjk(t)(ϵ−1)/ϵ dk
)
+ u
(
bj(t) − b(t)
p(t)
)
− κ
a
ydj (pj(t), t) −
γ
2
pij(t)2
+Aj(t)
[
ih(t)bj(t) + pj(t)ydj (pj(t), t) −
∫ 1
0
pk(t)cjk(t)dk − τ (t)
]
+ Bj(t)pij(t)pj(t),
with control variables cjk(t) for all k ∈ [0, 1] and pij(t), state variables bj(t) and pj(t), and costate
variables Aj(t) and Bj(t). Note that we have used the production and demand constraints to
substitute yj(t) andhj(t) out of the Hamiltonian. (To ease notation we now drop the time index t .)
We apply the necessary conditions for a maximum to the household’s problem given by Ace-
moglu (2009, theorem 7.9). These conditions form the basis of the model’s equilibrium conditions.
The rst optimality conditions are ∂Hj/∂cjk = 0 for all k ∈ [0, 1]. They yield
1
cj
(
cjk
cj
)−1/ϵ
= Ajpk . (A1)
Appropriately integrating (A1) over all k ∈ [0, 1] and using the expressions for the consumption
and price indices,
cj(t) =
[∫ 1
0
cjk(t)(ϵ−1)/ϵ dk
]ϵ/(ϵ−1)
(A2)
p(t) =
[∫ 1
0
pj(t)1−ϵ di
] 1/(1−ϵ)
, (A3)
we nd
Aj = 1
pcj
. (A4)
Moreover, combining (A1) and (A4), we obtain
cjk =
(
pk
p
)−ϵ
cj . (A5)
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Integrating (A5) over all j ∈ [0, 1], we get the usual demand for good k:
ydk (pk) =
∫ 1
0
cjk dj =
(
pk
p
)−ϵ
c, (A6)
where c =
∫ 1
0 cj dj is aggregate consumption. We use this expression for y
d
k
(pk) in household k ’s
Hamiltonian. Equation (A5) also implies that∫ 1
0
pkcjk dk =
∫ 1
0
pk
(
pk
p
)−ϵ
cj dk = pcj .
This means that when consumption expenditure is allocated optimally across goods, the price of
one unit of consumption index is p.
The second optimality condition is ∂Hj/∂bj = δAj − ÛAj , which gives
−
ÛAj
Aj = i
h +
1
pAj · u
′
(
bj − b
p
)
− δ .
Using (A4) and ih = i + σ , we obtain the household’s Euler equation:
Ûcj
cj
= i + σ − pi + cju′
(
bj − b
p
)
− δ . (A7)
This equation describes the optimal path for household j ’s consumption.
The third optimality condition is ∂Hj/∂pij = 0, which yields
Bjpj = γpij . (A8)
Differentiating (A8) with respect to time, we obtain
ÛBj
Bj =
Ûpij
pij
− pij . (A9)
The last optimality condition is ∂Hj/∂pj = δBj − ÛBj , which implies
κ
a
· ϵyj
pj
− (ϵ − 1)Ajyj + Bjpij = δBj − ÛBj .
Reshufing the terms then yields
pij −
(ϵ − 1)yjAj
Bjpj
(
pj − ϵ
ϵ − 1 ·
κ
aAj
)
= δ −
ÛBj
Bj .
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Finally, incorporating (A4), (A8), and (A9), we obtain the household’s Phillips curve:
Ûpij
pij
= δ +
(ϵ − 1)yj
γcjpij
(
pj
p
− ϵ
ϵ − 1 ·
κcj
a
)
. (A10)
This equation describes the optimal path for the price set by household j.
A.2. Equilibrium
We now describe the equilibrium of the model. Since all households face the same initial condi-
tions, they all behave the same. We therefore drop the subscripts j and k on all the variables. In
particular, all households hold the same wealth, so relative wealth is zero: bj = b. In addition,
production and consumption are equal in equilibrium: y = c.
Accordingly, the household’s Phillips curve, given by (A10), simplies to
Ûpi = δpi − ϵκ
γa
(y − yn) ,
where
yn =
ϵ − 1
ϵ
· a
κ
. (A11)
And the household’s Euler equation, given by (A7), simplies to
Ûy
y
= r − rn + u′(0)(y − yn),
where r = i − pi and
rn = δ − σ − u′(0)yn . (A12)
These differential equations are the Phillips curve (1) and Euler equation (4).
Appendix B. Heuristic derivation of Euler equation & Phillips curve
To better understand and interpret the continuous-time Euler equation and Phillips curve, we
complement the formal derivations of appendix A with heuristic derivations, as in Blanchard
and Fischer (1989, pp. 40–42).
B.1. Euler equation
The Euler equation says that households save in an optimal fashion: they cannot improve their
situation by shiing consumption a little bit across time.
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Consider a household delaying consumption of one unit of output from time t to time t + dt .
The unit of output, invested at a real interest rate rh(t), becomes 1 + rh(t)dt at time t + dt . Given
log consumption utility, the marginal utility from consumption at any time t is e−δt/y(t). Hence,
the household forgoes e−δt/y(t) utils at time t and gains
[1 + rh(t)dt] e
−δ (t+dt)
y(t + dt)
utils at time t + dt .
Since people enjoy holding wealth, the one unit of output saved between t and t +dt provides
hedonic returns in addition to nancial returns. The marginal utility from real wealth at time t is
e−δtu′(0). Hence, by holding an extra unit of real wealth for a duration dt , the household gains
e−δtu′(0)dt utils.
At the optimum, reallocating consumption over time does not affect utility, so the following
holds:
0 = −e
−δt
y(t) +
[
1 + rh(t)dt ] e−δ (t+dt)
y(t + dt) + e
−δtu′(0)dt .
Divided by e−δt/y(t), this condition becomes
1 = [1 + rh(t)dt]e−δdt y(t)
y(t + dt) + u
′(0)y(t)dt .
Furthermore, up to second-order terms, the following approximations are valid:
e−δdt = 1 − δdt
y(t + dt)
y(t) = 1 +
Ûy(t)
y(t)dt
1
1 + xdt
= 1 − xdt , for any x .
Hence, up to second-order terms, the previous condition gives
1 =
[
1 + rh(t)dt ] (1 − δdt) [1 − Ûy(t)
y(t)dt
]
+ u′(0)y(t)dt .
Keeping only rst-order terms, we obtain
1 = 1 − δdt + rh(t)dt − Ûy(t)
y(t)dt + u
′(0)y(t)dt .
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Reshufing the terms and dividing by dt , we conclude that
Ûy(t)
y(t) = r
h(t) − δ + u′(0)y(t).
We obtain the Euler equation (4) from here by noting that rh(t) = r (t) + σ and introducing the
natural rate of interest rn given by (A12).
B.2. Phillips curve
The Phillips curve says that households price in an optimal fashion: they cannot improve their
situation by shiing ination a little bit across time.
Consider a household delaying one percentage point of ination from time t to time t + dt .
Given the quadratic price-change disutility, the marginal disutility from ination at any time t is
e−δtγpi (t). Hence, at time t , the household avoids a disutility of
e−δtγpi (t) × 1%.
And, at time t + dt , the household incurs an extra disutility of
e−δ (t+dt)γpi (t + dt) × 1%.
Delaying ination by one percentage point reduces the household’s price between times t
and t + dt by dp(t) = −1% × p(t). The price drop then affects sales. Since the price elasticity of
demand is −ϵ , sales increase by
dy(t) = −ϵy(t) × −1% = ϵy(t) × 1%.
Accordingly, the household’s revenue grows by
d(p(t)y(t)) = p(t)dy(t) + y(t)dp(t) = (ϵ − 1)y(t)p(t) × 1%.
With a higher revenue, the household can afford to consume more. Since in equilibrium all
prices are the same, equal to p(t), the increase in revenue raises consumption by
dc(t) = d(p(t)y(t))
p(t) = (ϵ − 1)y(t) × 1%.
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Hence, between times t and t + dt , the utility of consumption increases by
e−δt
y(t)dc(t) = e
−δt (ϵ − 1) × 1%.
At the same time, because production is higher, the householdmust workmore. Hours worked
are extended by
dh(t) = dy(t)
a
=
ϵy(t)
a
× 1%.
As a result, between times t and t + dt , the disutility of labor is elevated by
e−δtκdh(t) = e−δt κϵy(t)
a
× 1%.
At the optimum, shiing ination across time does not affect utility, so the following holds:
0 = e−δtγpi (t) × 1% − e−δ (t+dt)γpi (t + dt) × 1% + e−δt (ϵ − 1) × 1% × dt − e−δtκϵy(t)
a
× 1% × dt .
Divided by e−δt × 1%, this condition yields
0 = γpi (t) − e−δdtγpi (t + dt) + (ϵ − 1) × dt − κϵy(t)
a
× dt .
Furthermore, up to second-order terms, the following approximations hold:
e−δdt = 1 − δdt
pi (t + dt) = pi (t) + Ûpi (t)dt .
Therefore, up to second-order terms, the previous condition gives
0 = γpi (t) − (1 − δdt)γ [pi (t) + Ûpi (t)dt] − κϵy(t)
a
dt + (ϵ − 1)dt
Then, keeping only rst-order terms, we obtain
0 = δγpi (t)dt − γ Ûpi (t)dt − κϵy(t)
a
dt + (ϵ − 1)dt .
Rearranging the terms and dividing by γdt , we conclude that
Ûpi (t) = δpi (t) − ϵκ
γa
[
y(t) − ϵ − 1
ϵ
· a
κ
]
.
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Once we introduce the natural level of output yn given by (A11), we obtain the Phillips curve (1).
The Phillips curve implies that without price-adjustment cost (γ = 0), households would
produce at the natural level of output. This result comes from the monopolistic nature of com-
petition. Without price-adjustment cost, it is optimal to charge a relative price that is a markup
ϵ/(ϵ − 1) over the real marginal cost. In turn, the real marginal cost is the marginal rate of substi-
tution between labor and consumption divided by the marginal product of labor. In equilibrium,
all relative prices are 1, the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption is
κ/(1/y) = κy , and the marginal product of labor is a. Hence, optimal pricing requires
1 =
ϵ
ϵ − 1 ·
κy
a
.
Combined with (A11), this condition implies y = yn.
The derivation also elucidates why in steady state, ination is positive whenever output is
above its natural level. When ination is positive, a household can reduce its price-adjustment
cost by lowering its ination. Since pricing is optimal, however, there cannot exist any protable
deviation from the equilibrium. This means that the household must also incur a cost when it
lowers ination. A consequence of lowering ination is that the price charged by the household
drops, which stimulates its sales and production. The absence of protable deviation imposes
that the household incurs a cost when production increases. In other words, production must be
excessive: output must be above its natural level.
Appendix C. Euler equation & Phillips curve in discrete time
We recast the model of section 3 in discrete time, and we rederive the Euler equation and Phillips
curve. This reformulation might be helpful to compare our model to the textbook New Keynesian
model, which is presented in discrete time (Woodford 2003; Gali 2008). The reformulation also
shows that introducing wealth in the utility function yields a discounted Euler equation.
C.1. Assumptions
The assumptions are the same in the discrete-timemodel as in the continuous-timemodel, except
for government bonds. In discrete time, households trade one-period government bonds. Bonds
purchased in period t have a price q(t) and pay one unit of money in period t + 1. The nominal
interest rate on government bonds is dened as ih(t) = − ln(q(t)).
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C.2. Household’s problem
Household j chooses sequences
{
yj(t),pj(t),hj(t),
[
cjk(t)
] 1
k=0 ,bj(t)
}∞
t=0
tomaximize thediscounted
sum of instantaneous utilities
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ϵ
ϵ − 1 ln
(∫ 1
0
cjk(t)(ϵ−1)/ϵ dk
)
+ u
(
bj(t) − b(t)
p(t)
)
− κhj(t) − γ2
[
pj(t)
pj(t − 1) − 1
]2}
dt ,
where β < 1 is the time discount factor. The maximization is subject to three constraints. First,
there is a production function: yj(t) = ahj(t). Second, there is the demand for good j:
yj(t) =
[
pj(t)
p(t)
]−ϵ
c(t) ≡ ydj (pj(t), t).
The demand for good j is the same as in continuous time because the allocation of consumption
expenditure across goods is a static decision, so it is unaffected by the representation of time.
And third, there is a budget constraint:∫ 1
0
pk(t)cjk(t)dk + q(t)bj(t) + τ (t) = pj(t)yj(t) + bj(t − 1).
Household j is also subject to a solvency constraint preventing Ponzi schemes. Lastly, household j
takes as given the initial conditions bj(−1) and pj(−1), as well as the sequences of aggregate
variables {p(t),q(t), c(t)}∞t=0.
The Lagrangian of the household’s problem is
Lj =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ϵ
ϵ − 1 ln
(∫ 1
0
cjk(t)(ϵ−1)/ϵ dk
)
+ u
(
bj(t) − b(t)
p(t)
)
− κ
a
ydj (pj(t), t) −
γ
2
[
pj(t)
pj(t − 1) − 1
]2
+Aj(t)
[
pj(t)ydj (pj(t), t) + bj(t − 1) −
∫ 1
0
pk(t)cjk(t)dk − q(t)bj(t) − τ (t)
] }
whereAj(t) is a Lagrange multiplier. We have used the production and demand constraints to
substitute hj(t) and yj(t) out of the Lagrangian.
The necessary conditions for a maximum to the household’s problem are standard rst-order
conditions. The rst optimality conditions are ∂Lj/∂cjk(t) = 0 for all k ∈ [0, 1] and all t . As in
continuous time, these conditions yield
Aj(t) = 1
p(t)cj(t) . (A13)
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The second optimality condition is ∂Lj/∂bj(t) = 0 for all t , which gives
q(t)Aj(t) = 1
p(t)u
′
(
bj(t) − b(t)
p(t)
)
+ βAj(t + 1).
Using (A13), we obtain the household’s Euler equation:
q(t) = cj(t)u′
(
bj(t) − b(t)
p(t)
)
+ β
p(t)cj(t)
p(t + 1)cj(t + 1) . (A14)
The third optimality condition is ∂Lj/∂pj(t) = 0 for all t , which yields
0 =
κ
a
· ϵyj(t)
pj(t) −
γ
pj(t − 1)
[
pj(t)
pj(t − 1) − 1
]
+ (1 − ϵ)Aj(t)yj(t) + βγ
pj(t + 1)
pj(t)2
[
pj(t + 1)
pj(t) − 1
]
.
Multiplying this equation by pj(t)/γ and using (A13), we obtain the household’s Phillips curve:
pj(t)
pj(t − 1)
[
pj(t)
pj(t − 1) − 1
]
= β
pj(t + 1)
pj(t)
[
pj(t + 1)
pj(t) − 1
]
+
ϵκ
γa
yj(t) − ϵ − 1
γ
· pj(t)yj(t)
p(t)cj(t) . (A15)
C.3. Equilibrium
We now describe the equilibrium. Since all households face the same initial conditions, they
all behave the same, so we drop the subscripts j and k on all the variables. In particular, all
households hold the same wealth, so relative wealth is zero: bj(t) = b(t). In addition, production
and consumption are equal in equilibrium: y(t) = c(t).
Accordingly, from (A14) we obtain the Euler equation
q(t) = u′(0)y(t) + β p(t)y(t)
p(t + 1)y(t + 1) . (A16)
Moreover, combining (A15) and (A11), we obtain the Phillips curve
p(t)
p(t − 1)
[
p(t)
p(t − 1) − 1
]
= β
p(t + 1)
p(t)
[
p(t + 1)
p(t) − 1
]
+
ϵ − 1
γ
[
y(t)
yn
− 1
]
. (A17)
C.4. Log-linearization
To obtain the standard expressions of the Euler equation and Phillips curve, we log-linearize
(A16) and (A17) around the natural steady state: where y = yn, pi = 0, and i = rn. To that end, we
introduce the log-deviation of output from its steady-state level: yˆ(t) = ln(y(t)) − ln(yn). We also
introduce the ination rate between periods t and t + 1: pi (t + 1) = ln(p(t + 1)) − ln(p(t)).
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Euler equation. We start by log-linearizing the Euler equation (A16).
We rst take the log of the le-hand side of (A16). Using the discrete-time denition of the
nominal interest rate faced by households, ih(t), we obtain ln(q(t)) = −ih(t). At the natural steady
state, the monetary-policy rate is i = rn, so the interest rate faced by households is ih = rn + σ ,
and ln(q(t)) = −rn − σ .
Next we take the log of the right-hand side of (A16). We obtain Λ ≡ ln(Λ1 + Λ2), where
Λ1 ≡ u′(0)y(t), Λ2 ≡ β p(t)y(t)
p(t + 1)y(t + 1) .
For future reference, we compute the values of Λ, Λ1, and Λ2 at the natural steady state. At the
natural steady state, the log of the le-hand side of (A16) equals −rn − σ , which implies that the
log of the right-hand side of (A16) must also equal −rn − σ . That is, at the natural steady state,
Λ = −rn − σ . Moreover, at that steady state, Λ1 = u′(0)yn. And, since ination is zero and output
is constant at that steady state, Λ2 = β .
Using these results, we obtain a rst-order approximation of Λ(Λ1, Λ2) around the natural
steady state:
Λ = −rn − σ + ∂Λ
∂Λ1
[Λ1 − u′(0)yn] + ∂Λ
∂Λ2
[Λ2 − β] .
Factoring outu′(0)yn and β , and using the denitions of Λ1 and Λ2, we obtain
Λ = −rn − σ + u′(0)yn · ∂Λ
∂Λ1
·
[
y(t)
yn
− 1
]
+ β · ∂Λ
∂Λ2
·
[
p(t)y(t)
p(t + 1)y(t + 1) − 1
]
. (A18)
Since Λ = ln(Λ1 + Λ2), we obviously have
∂Λ
∂Λ1
=
∂Λ
∂Λ2
=
1
Λ1 + Λ2
.
In (A18), the derivatives are evaluated at the natural state, so
∂Λ
∂Λ1
=
∂Λ
∂Λ2
=
1
u′(0)yn + β .
Hence, (A18) becomes
Λ = −rn − σ + u
′(0)yn
u′(0)yn + β
[
y(t)
yn
− 1
]
+
β
u′(0)yn + β
[
p(t)y(t)
p(t + 1)y(t + 1) − 1
]
. (A19)
Last, up to second-order terms, we have ln(x) = x − 1 around x = 1. Thus, we have the
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following rst-order approximations around the natural steady state:
y(t)
yn
− 1 = ln
(
y(t)
yn
)
= yˆ(t) (A20)
and
p(t)y(t)
p(t + 1)y(t + 1) − 1 = ln
(
p(t)y(t)
p(t + 1)y(t + 1)
)
= ln
(
y(t)
yn
)
− ln
(
y(t + 1)
yn
)
− ln
(
p(t + 1)
p(t)
)
= yˆ(t) − yˆ(t + 1) − pi (t + 1).
We can therefore rewrite (A19) as
Λ = −rn − σ + u
′(0)yn
u′(0)yn + β yˆ(t) +
β
u′(0)yn + β [yˆ(t) − yˆ(t + 1) − pi (t + 1)] .
Finally, introducing
α =
β
β + u′(0)yn ,
we obtain
Λ = −rn − σ + (1 − α)yˆ(t) + α [yˆ(t) − yˆ(t + 1) − pi (t + 1)] .
In conclusion, taking the log of the Euler equation (A16) yields
−ih(t) = −rn − σ + (1 − α)yˆ(t) + α [yˆ(t) − yˆ(t + 1) − pi (t + 1)]
Reshufing the terms and noting that ih(t) = i(t)+σ , we obtain the log-linearized Euler equation:
yˆ(t) = αyˆ(t + 1) − [i(t) − rn − αpi (t + 1)] . (A21)
Discounting. Becauseu′(0) > 0, we have
α =
β
β + u′(0)yn < 1.
Thus, because the marginal utility of wealth is positive, the Euler equation is discounted: future
output, yˆ(t + 1), appears discounted by the coefcient α < 1 in (A21). Such discounting also
appears in the presence of overlapping generations (Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson 2015;
Eggertsson, Mehrotra, and Robbins 2019); heterogeneous agents facing borrowing constraints
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and cyclical income risk (McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson 2017; Acharya and Dogra 2019; Bilbiie
2019); consumers’ bounded rationality (Gabaix 2016); incomplete information (Angeletos and
Lian 2018); bonds in the utility function (Campbell et al. 2017); and borrowing costs increasing in
household debt (Beaudry and Portier 2018).
To make discounting more apparent, we solve the Euler equation forward:
yˆ(t) = −
+∞∑
k=0
αk [i(t + k) − rn − αpi (t + k + 1)] .
The effect on current output of interest rates k periods in the future is discounted by αk < 1;
hence, discounting is stronger for interest rates further in the future (McKay, Nakamura, and
Steinsson 2017, p. 821).
Phillips curve. Next we log-linearize the Phillips curve (A17).
We start with the le-hand side of (A17). The rst-order approximations of x(x − 1) and ln(x)
around x = 1 both are x − 1. This means that up to second-order terms, we have x(x − 1) = ln(x)
around x = 1. Hence, up to second-order terms, the following approximation holds around the
natural steady state:
p(t)
p(t − 1)
[
p(t)
p(t − 1) − 1
]
= ln
(
p(t)
p(t − 1)
)
= pi (t).
We turn to the right-hand side of (A17) and proceed similarly. We nd that up to second-order
terms, the following approximation holds around the natural steady state:
β
p(t + 1)
p(t)
[
p(t + 1)
p(t) − 1
]
= β ln
(
p(t + 1)
p(t)
)
= βpi (t + 1).
Furthermore, (A20) implies that up to second-order terms, the ensuing approximation holds
around the natural steady state:
ϵ − 1
γ
[
y(t)
yn
− 1
]
=
ϵ − 1
γ
yˆ(t).
Combining all these results, we obtain the log-linearized Phillips curve:
pi (t) = βpi (t + 1) + ϵ − 1
γ
yˆ(t). (A22)
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Appendix D. Proofs
Weprovide alternative proofs of propositions 1 and 2. These proofs are not graphical but algebraic;
they are closer to the proofs found in the literature.We also complement the proof of proposition 4.
D.1. Alternative proof of proposition 1
We study the properties of the dynamical system generated by the Phillips curve (1) and Euler
equation (4) in normal times. The natural rate of interest is positive and monetary policy imposes
r (pi ) = rn + (ϕ − 1)pi .
Steady state. A steady state [y,pi ]must satisfy the steady-state Phillips curve (3) and steady-state
Euler equation (7). These equations form a linear system:
pi =
ϵκ
δγa
(y − yn)
(ϕ − 1)pi = −u′(0)(y − yn).
As [y = yn,pi = 0] satises both equations, it is a steady state. Furthermore the steady state
is unique because the two equations are non-parallel. In the NK model, this is obvious since
u′(0) = 0. In the WUNKmodel, the slope of the second equation is −u′(0)/(ϕ − 1). If ϕ > 1, the
slope is negative. If ϕ ∈ [0, 1), the slope is positive and strictly greater thanu′(0) and thus than
ϵκ/(δγa) (because (9) holds). In both cases, the two equations have different slopes.
Linearization. The Euler-Phillips system is nonlinear, so we determine its properties by lin-
earizing it around its steady state. We rst write the Euler equation and Phillips curve as
Ûy(t) = E(y(t),pi (t)), where E(y,pi ) = y[(ϕ − 1)pi + u′(0)(y − yn)]
Ûpi (t) = P(y(t),pi (t)), where P(y,pi ) = δpi − ϵκ
γa
(y − yn).
Around the natural steady state, the linearized Euler-Phillips system is[
Ûy(t)
Ûpi (t)
]
=

∂E
∂y
∂E
∂pi
∂P
∂y
∂P
∂pi

[
y(t) − yn
pi
]
,
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where the derivatives are evaluated at [y = yn,pi = 0]. We have
∂E
∂y
= ynu′(0), ∂E
∂pi
= yn(ϕ − 1)
∂P
∂y
= −ϵκ
γa
,
∂P
∂pi
= δ .
Accordingly the linearized Euler-Phillips system is[
Ûy(t)
Ûpi (t)
]
=
[
u′(0)yn (ϕ − 1)yn
−ϵκ/(γa) δ
] [
y(t) − yn
pi (t)
]
. (A23)
We denote byM thematrix in (A23), and by µ1 ∈ C and µ2 ∈ C the two eigenvalues ofM , assumed
to be distinct.
Solution with two real eigenvalues. We begin by solving (A23) when µ1 and µ2 are real and
nonzero. Without loss of generality, we assume µ1 < µ2. Then the solution takes the form[
y(t) − yn
pi (t)
]
= x1e
µ1tv1 + x2e
µ2tv2, (A24)
wherev1 ∈ R2 andv2 ∈ R2 are the linearly independent eigenvectors respectively associated
with the eigenvalues µ1 and µ2, and x1 ∈ R and x2 ∈ R are constants determined by the terminal
condition (Hirsch, Smale, and Devaney 2013, p. 35).
From (A24), we see that the Euler-Phillips system is a source when µ1 > 0 and µ2 > 0.
Moreover, the solutions are tangent tov1 when t → −∞ and are parallel tov2 when t → +∞.
The system is a saddle when µ1 < 0 and µ2 > 0; in that case, the vectorv1 gives the direction of
the stable line (saddle path) while the vectorv2 gives the direction of the unstable line. Lastly,
when µ1 < 0 and µ2 < 0, the system is a sink. (See Hirsch, Smale, and Devaney 2013, pp. 40–44.)
Solution with two complex eigenvalues. Next we solve (A23) when µ1 and µ2 are complex con-
jugates. We write the eigenvalues as µ1 = θ + iς and µ2 = θ − iς . We also write the eigenvector
associated with µ1 asv1 + iv2, where the vectorsv1 ∈ R2 andv2 ∈ R2 are linearly independent.
Then the solution takes a more complicated form:[
y(t) − yn
pi (t)
]
= eθt [v1,v2]
[
cos(ςt) sin(ςt)
− sin(ςt) cos(ςt)
] [
x1
x2
]
,
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where [v1,v2] ∈ R2×2 is a 2 × 2matrix, and x1 ∈ R and x2 ∈ R are constants determined by the
terminal condition (Hirsch, Smale, and Devaney 2013, pp. 44–55).
These solutions wind periodically around the steady state, either moving toward it (θ < 0) or
away from it (θ > 0). Hence, the Euler-Phillips system is a spiral source if θ > 0 and a spiral sink
if θ < 0. In the special case θ = 0, the solutions circle around the steady state: the Euler-Phillips
system is a center. (See Hirsch, Smale, and Devaney 2013, pp. 44–47.)
Classication. We classify the Euler-Phillips system from the trace and determinant of M
(Hirsch, Smale, and Devaney 2013, pp. 61–64). The classication relies on the property that
tr(M) = µ1 + µ2 and det(M) = µ1µ2. The following situations may occur in the NK and WUNK
models:
• det(M) < 0: Then the Euler-Phillips system is a saddle. This is because det(M) < 0 indicates
that µ1 and µ2 are real, nonzero, and of opposite sign. Indeed, if µ1 and µ2 were real and of
the same sign, det(M) = µ1µ2 > 0; and if they were complex conjugates, det(M) = µ1µ1 =
Re(µ1)2 + Im(µ1)2 > 0.
• det(M) > 0 and tr(M) > 0: Then the Euler-Phillips system is a source. This is because
det(M) > 0 indicates that µ1 and µ2 are either real, nonzero, and of the same sign; or complex
conjugates. Since in addition tr(M) > 0, µ1 and µ2 must be either real and positive, or complex
with a positive real part. Indeed, if µ1 and µ2 were real and negative, tr(M) = µ1 + µ2 < 0; if
they were complex with a negative real part, tr(M) = µ1 + µ1 = 2 Re(µ1) < 0.
Using (A23), we compute the trace and determinant ofM:
tr(M) = δ + u′(0)yn
det(M) = δu′(0)yn + (ϕ − 1)ϵκ
γa
yn .
In the NK model,u′(0) = 0, so tr(M) = δ > 0 and
det(M) = (ϕ − 1)y
nϵκ
γa
.
If ϕ > 1, tr(M) > 0 and det(M) > 0, so the system is a source. If ϕ < 1, det(M) < 0, so the system
is a saddle.
In the WUNKmodel, tr(M) > δ > 0. Further, using ϕ − 1 ≥ −1 and (9), we have
det(M) ≥ δu′(0)yn − ϵκ
γa
yn = δyn
[
u′(0) − ϵκ
δγa
]
> 0.
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Since tr(M) > 0 and det(M) > 0, the system is a source.
D.2. Alternative proof of proposition 2
We study the properties of the dynamical system generated by the Phillips curve (1) and Euler
equation (4) at the ZLB. The natural rate of interest is negative and monetary policy imposes
r (pi ) = −pi .
Steady state. A steady state [y,pi ]must satisfy the steady-state Phillips curve (3) and the steady-
state Euler equation (7). These equations form a linear system:
pi =
ϵκ
δγa
(y − yn) (A25)
pi = −rn + u′(0)(y − yn). (A26)
A solution to this system with positive output is a steady state.
In the NK model,u′(0) = 0, so the system admits a unique solution:
piz = −rn
yz = yn − δγa
ϵκ
rn .
Since rn < 0, the solution satises yz > yn > 0: the solution has positive output so it is a steady
state. Hence the NK model admits a unique steady state at the ZLB: [yz,piz], where piz > 0 (since
rn < 0) and yz > yn.
In the WUNKmodel, since (9) holds, the equations (A25) and (A26) are non-parallel, so the
system admits a unique solution, denoted [yz,piz]. Using (A25) to substitute y − yn out of (A26),
we nd that
piz =
rn
u′(0)δγa/(ϵκ) − 1 . (A27)
Condition (9) implies that the denominator is positive. Since rn < 0, we conclude that piz < 0.
Next, combining (A25) and (A27), we obtain
yz = yn +
rn
u′(0) − ϵκ/(δγa) . (A28)
Since (9) holds, the denominator of the fraction is positive. As rn < 0, we conclude that yz < yn.
Finally, to establish that [yz,piz] is a steady state, we need to verify that yz > 0. According to
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(A28), we need
yn >
−rn
u′(0) − ϵκ/(δγa) .
Equations (5) and (9) indicate that
−rn = u′(0)yn − δ and u′(0) − ϵκ
δγa
> 0.
The above inequality is therefore equivalent to[
u′(0) − ϵκ
δγa
]
yn > u′(0)yn − δ .
Eliminatingu′(0)yn on both sides, we nd that this is equivalent to
−ϵκy
n
δγa
> −δ , or δ 2 > ϵκy
n
γa
.
Equation (A11) implies that
ϵκyn
γa
=
ϵ − 1
γ
.
So we need to verify that
δ 2 >
ϵ − 1
γ
.
But we have imposed δ >
√(ϵ − 1)/γ in the WUNKmodel, to accommodate a positive natural
rate of interest. We can therefore conclude that yz > 0, and that [yz,piz] is a steady state.
Linearization. The Euler-Phillips system is nonlinear, so we determine its properties by lin-
earizing it. Around the ZLB steady state, the linearized Euler-Phillips system is[
Ûy(t)
Ûpi (t)
]
=
[
u′(0)yz −yz
−ϵκ/(γa) δ
] [
y(t) − yz
pi (t) − piz
]
. (A29)
To obtain the matrix, denotedM, we set ϕ = 0 and replace yn by yz in the matrix from (A23).
Classication. We classify the Euler-Phillips system (A29) by computing the trace and determi-
nant ofM, as in appendix D.1. We have tr(M) = δ + u′(0)yz > 0 and
det(M) = δyz
[
u′(0) − ϵκ
δγa
]
.
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In the NKmodel,u′(0) = 0 so det(M) < 0, which implies that the Euler-Phillips system is a saddle.
In the WUNKmodel, (9) implies that det(M) > 0. Since in addition tr(M) > 0, the Euler-Phillips
system is a source. In fact, in the WUNKmodel, the discriminant of the characteristic equation
ofM is strictly positive:
tr(M)2 − 4 det(M) = δ 2 + [u′(0)yn]2 + 2δu′(0)yn − 4δu′(0)yn + 4ϵκ
γa
yn
= [δ − u′(0)yn]2 + 4ϵκ
γa
yn > 0.
Hence the eigenvalues ofM are real, not complex: the Euler-Phillips system is a nodal source,
not a spiral source.
D.3. Complement to the proof of proposition 4
We characterize the forward-guidance duration∆∗ for the NKmodel, and the ZLB durationT ∗ for
the WUNKmodel.
In the NK model, ∆∗ is the duration of forward guidance that brings the economy on the
unstable line of the ZLB phase diagram at timeT (gure 3, panel C).With longer forward guidance
(∆ > ∆∗), the economy is above the unstable line at timeT , and so it is connected to trajectories
that come from the northeast quadrant of the ZLB phase diagram (gure 3, panel D). As a conse-
quence, during ZLB and forward guidance, ination is positive and output is above its natural
level. Moreover, since the position of the economy at the end of the ZLB is unaffected by the
duration of the ZLB, initial output and ination become arbitrarily high as the ZLB duration of
the ZLB approaches innity.
In the WUNKmodel, for any forward-guidance duration, the economy at timeT is bound to
be in the right-hand triangle of gure 4, panel D. All the points in that triangle are connected to
trajectories that ow from the ZLB steady state, through the le-hand triangle of gure 4, panel D.
For any of these trajectories, initial ination pi (0) converges from above to the ZLB steady state’s
ination piz as the ZLB durationT goes to innity. Since piz < 0, we infer that for each trajectory,
there is a ZLB duration Tˆ , such that for anyT > Tˆ , pi (0) < 0. Furthermore, as showed in panel D
of gure 4, y(0) < yn whenever pi (0) < 0. The ZLB durationT ∗ is constructed asT ∗ = max{Tˆ }.
The maximum exists because the right-hand triangle is a closed and bounded subset ofR2, so
the set
{
Tˆ
}
is a closed and bounded subset ofR, which admits a maximum. We know that the set{
Tˆ
}
is closed and bounded because the function that maps a position at timeT to a threshold Tˆ
is continuous.
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Appendix E. Model with government spending
We introduce government spending into the model of section 3. We compute the model’s Euler
equation and Phillips curve, linearize them, and use the linearized equations to construct the
model’s phase diagrams.
E.1. Assumptions
We start from the model of section 3, and we assume that the government purchases a quantity
дj(t) of each good j ∈ [0, 1]. These quantities are aggregated into an index of public consumption
д(t) ≡
[∫ 1
0
дj(t)(ϵ−1)/ϵ dj
]ϵ/(ϵ−1)
. (A30)
Public consumption д(t) enters separately into households’ utility functions. Government expen-
diture is nanced with lump-sum taxation.
Additionally, we assume that the disutility of labor is not linear but convex. Household j incurs
disutility
κ1+η
1 + η
hj(t)1+η
from working, where η > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. The utility function is altered to
ensure that government spending affects ination and private consumption.
E.2. Euler equation & Phillips curve
We derive the Euler equation and Phillips curve just as in appendix A.
The only new step is to compute the government’s spending on each good. At any time t , the
government chooses the amount дj(t) of each good j ∈ [0, 1] to minimize the expenditure∫ 1
0
pj(t)дj(t)dj
subject to the constraint of providing an amount of public consumption д:[∫ 1
0
дj(t)(ϵ−1)/ϵ dj
]ϵ/(ϵ−1)
= д(t).
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To solve the government’s problem at time t , we set up a Lagrangian:
L =
∫ 1
0
pj(t)дj(t)dj + C ·
{
д −
[∫ 1
0
дj(t)(ϵ−1)/ϵ dj
]ϵ/(ϵ−1)}
,
where C is a Lagrange multiplier. We then follow the same steps as in the derivation of (A6). The
rst-order conditions with respect to дj(t) for all j ∈ [0, 1] are ∂L/∂дj = 0. These conditions
imply
pj(t) = C ·
[
дj(t)
д(t)
]−1/ϵ
. (A31)
Appropriately integrating (A31) over all j ∈ [0, 1], and using (A3) and (A30), we nd
C = p(t). (A32)
Lastly, combining (A31) and (A32), we obtain the government’s demand for good j:
дj(t) =
[
pj(t)
p(t)
]−ϵ
д(t). (A33)
Next we solve household j ’s problem. We set up the current-value Hamiltonian:
Hj = ϵ
ϵ − 1 ln
(∫ 1
0
cjk(t)(ϵ−1)/ϵ dk
)
+ u
(
bj(t) − b(t)
p(t)
)
− 1
1 + η
[κ
a
ydj (pj(t), t)
] 1+η − γ
2
pij(t)2
+Aj(t)
[
ih(t)bj(t) + pj(t)ydj (pj(t), t) −
∫ 1
0
pk(t)cjk(t)dk − τ (t)
]
+ Bj(t)pij(t)pj(t).
The terms featuring the consumption levels cjk(t) in the Hamiltonian are the same as in
appendix A.1, so the optimality conditions ∂Hj/∂cjk = 0 remain the same. This implies that (A1),
(A4), and (A5) remain valid. Adding the government’s demand, given by (A33), to households’
demand, given by (A5), we obtain the total demand for good j at time t :
ydj (pj(t), t) = дj(t) +
∫ 1
0
cjk(t)dk =
[
pj(t)
p(t)
]−ϵ
y(t),
where y(t) ≡ д(t)+
∫ 1
0 cj(t)dj measures total consumption. The expression for ydj (pj(t), t) enters
the HamiltonianHj .
The terms featuring the bondholdingsbj(t) in theHamiltonian are the same as in appendix A.1.
Therefore, the optimality condition ∂Hj/∂bj = δAj − ÛAj remains the same, and the Euler
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equation (A7) remains valid. In equilibrium, the Euler equation simplies to
Ûc
c
= r − δ + σ + u′(0)c . (A34)
The terms featuring ination pij(t) in the Hamiltonian are also the same as in appendix A.1.
Thus, the optimality condition ∂Hj/∂pij = 0 is unchanged, and (A8) and (A9) hold.
Last, because the disutility from labor is convex, the optimality condition ∂Hj/∂pj = δBj− ÛBj
is modied. The condition now gives
ϵ
pj
(κ
a
yj
)1+η
+ (1 − ϵ)Ajyj + Bjpij = δBj − ÛBj ,
which can be rewritten
pij −
(ϵ − 1)yjAj
Bjpj
[
pj − ϵ
ϵ − 1
(κ
a
)1+η yηj
Aj
]
= δ −
ÛBj
Bj .
Combining this equation with (A4), (A8), and (A9), we obtain the household’s Phillips curve:
Ûpij
pij
= δ +
(ϵ − 1)yj
γcjpij
[
pj
p
− ϵ
ϵ − 1
(κ
a
)1+η
y
η
j cj
]
. (A35)
In equilibrium, the Phillips curve simplies to
Ûpi = δpi + (ϵ − 1)(c + д)
γc
[
1 − ϵ
ϵ − 1
(κ
a
)1+η (c + д)ηc] , (A36)
where c + д = y is aggregate output.
E.3. Linearized Euler-Phillips system
We now linearize the Euler-Phillips system around the natural steady state, which has zero
ination and no government spending. The analysis of the model with government spending is
based on this linearized system.
Since Ûpi = pi = д = 0 at the natural steady state, (A36) implies that the natural level of
consumption is
cn =
(
ϵ − 1
ϵ
)1/(1+η)
a
κ
.
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Since Ûc = 0 and c = cn at the natural steady state, (A34) implies that the natural rate of interest is
rn = δ − σ − u′(0)cn .
Euler equation. We rst linearize the Euler equation (A34) around the point [c = cn,pi = 0]. We
consider two different monetary-policy rules. First, when monetary policy is normal, r (pi ) =
rn + (ϕ − 1)pi . Then the Euler equation is Ûc = E(c,pi ), where
E(c,pi ) = c [(ϕ − 1)pi + u′(0)(c − cn)] .
The linearized version is
Ûc = E(cn, 0) + ∂E
∂c
(c − cn) + ∂E
∂pi
pi ,
where the derivatives are evaluated at [c = cn,pi = 0]. We have
E(cn, 0) = 0, ∂E
∂c
= cnu′(0), ∂E
∂pi
= cn(ϕ − 1).
So the linearized Euler equation with normal monetary policy is
Ûc = cn [(ϕ − 1)pi + u′(0)(c − cn)] . (A37)
Second, when monetary policy is at the ZLB, r (pi ) = −pi . Then the Euler equation can be
written Ûc = E(c,pi ) where
E(c,pi ) = c [−rn − pi + u′(0)(c − cn)] .
The linearized version is
Ûc = E(cn, 0) + ∂E
∂c
(c − cn) + ∂E
∂pi
pi ,
where the derivatives are evaluated at [c = cn,pi = 0]. We have
E(cn, 0) = −cnrn, ∂E
∂c
= cnu′(0), ∂E
∂pi
= −cn .
So the linearized Euler equation at the ZLB is
Ûc = cn [−rn − pi + u′(0)(c − cn)] . (A38)
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In steady state, at the ZLB, the linearized Euler equation becomes
pi = −rn + u′(0)(c − cn). (A39)
Phillips curve. Next we linearize the Phillips curve (A36) around the point [c = cn,pi = 0,д = 0].
The Phillips curve can be written Ûpi = P(c,pi ,д) where
P(c,pi ,д) = δpi + (ϵ − 1)(c + д)
γc
[
1 − ϵ
ϵ − 1
(κ
a
)1+η (c + д)ηc] .
The linearized version is
Ûpi = P(cn, 0, 0) + ∂P
∂c
(c − cn) + ∂P
∂pi
pi +
∂P
∂д
д,
where the derivatives are evaluated at [c = cn,pi = 0,д = 0]. We have
P(cn, 0, 0) = 0
∂P
∂c
= −ϵ
γ
(κ
a
)1+η (1 + η) (cn)η = −(1 + η)ϵκ
γa
(
ϵ − 1
ϵ
)η/(1+η)
∂P
∂pi
= δ
∂P
∂д
= −ϵ
γ
(κ
a
)1+η
η (cn)η = −ηϵκ
γa
(
ϵ − 1
ϵ
)η/(1+η)
.
Hence, the linearized Phillips curve is
Ûpi = δpi − ϵκ
γa
(
ϵ − 1
ϵ
)η/(1+η)
[(1 + η) (c − cn) + ηд] . (A40)
In steady state, the linearized Phillips curve becomes
pi = − ϵκ
δγa
(
ϵ − 1
ϵ
)η/(1+η)
[(1 + η)(c − cn) + ηд] . (A41)
E.4. Phase diagrams
Using the linearized Euler-Phillips system, we construct the phase diagrams of the NK andWUNK
models with government spending.
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A. NKmodel: normal times, active monetary policy B. WUNKmodel: normal times, active monetary policy
C. NKmodel: ZLB D. WUNKmodel: ZLB
Figure A1. Phase diagrams of the linearized Euler-Phillips system in the NK and WUNKmodels
with government spending
The gure displays phase diagrams for the linearized Euler-Phillips system in the model with government spending:
c is private consumption; pi is ination; cn is the natural level of consumption; the Euler line is the locus Ûc = 0;
the Phillips line is the locus Ûpi = 0; the trajectories are solutions to the system, plotted for t going from −∞ to +∞.
The four panels contrast various cases. The NK model is the standard New Keynesian model. The WUNK model
is the same model, except that the marginal utility of wealth is not zero but is sufciently large to satisfy (12). In
normal times with active monetary policy, the natural rate of interest rn is positive, the monetary-policy rate is given
by i = rn + ϕpi with ϕ > 1, and government spending is zero; the Euler-Phillips system is composed of (A37) with
ϕ > 1 and (A40) with д = 0. At the ZLB, the natural rate of interest is negative, the monetary-policy rate is zero,
and government spending is positive; the Euler-Phillips system is composed of (A38) and (A40) with д > 0. The
gure shows that in the NK model, the Euler-Phillips system is a source in normal times with active monetary policy
(panel A); but the system is a saddle at the ZLB (panel C). In the WUNKmodel, by contrast, the Euler-Phillips system
is a source both in normal times and at the ZLB (panels B and D). (Panels A and B display a nodal source, but the
system could also be a spiral source, depending on the value of ϕ; in panel D the system is always a nodal source.)
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Normal times. We rst construct the phase diagrams for normal times with active monetary
policy. The linearized Euler-Phillips system is composed of (A37) with ϕ > 1 and (A40) with д = 0.
We construct a phase diagramwith private consumption c on the horizontal axis and ination
pi on the vertical axis. We follow the methodology developed in section 3: we plot the loci Ûpi = 0
and Ûc = 0, and then determine the sign of Ûpi and Ûc in the four quadrants of the plan delimited by
the two loci. The resulting phase diagrams are displayed in panels A and B of gure A1. They are
similar to the phase diagrams in the basic model (panels A and B of gure 1).15
The phase diagrams show that in normal times, with activemonetary policy, the Euler-Phillips
system is a source in the NK and WUNKmodels. An algebraic approach conrms this result. The
linearized Euler-Phillips system can be written[
Ûc
Ûpi
]
=
[
u′(0)cn (ϕ − 1)cn
−(1 + η)ϵκγa
( ϵ−1
ϵ
)η/(1+η)
δ
] [
c − cn
pi
]
.
We denote the above matrix by M. We classify the Euler-Phillips system using the trace and
determinant ofM, as in appendix D.1:
tr(M) = δ + u′(0)cn
det(M) = δcn
[
u′(0) + (ϕ − 1)(1 + η) ϵκ
δγa
(
ϵ − 1
ϵ
)η/(1+η)]
.
In the NK model, u′(0) = 0 so tr(M) = δ > 0 and the sign of det(M) is given by the sign of
ϕ − 1. Accordingly when monetary policy is active (ϕ > 1), det(M) > 0: the Euler-Phillips system
is a source. In contrast, when monetary policy is passive (ϕ < 1), det(M) < 0: the Euler-Phillips
system is a saddle.
In the WUNKmodel, tr(M) > δ > 0. Moreover, ϕ − 1 ≥ −1 for any ϕ ≥ 0, so we have
det(M) ≥ δcn
[
u′(0) − (1 + η) ϵκ
δγa
(
ϵ − 1
ϵ
)η/(1+η)]
.
The WUNK assumption (12) says that the term in square brackets is positive, so det(M) > 0. We
conclude that the Euler-Phillips system is a source whether monetary policy is active or passive.
ZLB. We turn to the phase diagrams at the ZLB. The linearized Euler-Phillips system is composed
of (A38) and (A40) with д > 0.
15The phase diagrams of gure 1 have output y on the horizontal axis instead of private consumption c. But y = c
in the basic model (government spending is zero), so phase diagrams with c on the horizontal axis would be identical.
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Once again, we follow themethodology developed in section 3 to construct the phase diagrams.
The resulting phase diagrams are displayed in panels C and D of gure A1. The diagrams have
the same properties as in the basic model (panels C and D of gure 1), but for one difference:
the Phillips line shis upward because government spending is positive. Hence, the Phillips
line lies above the point [c = cn,pi = 0]. While this shi does not affect the classication of the
Euler-Phillips system (source or saddle), it changes the location of the steady state. In fact, by
solving the system given by (A39) and (A41), we nd that private consumption and ination at the
ZLB steady state are
cд = cn +
rn + ϵκδγa
( ϵ−1
ϵ
)η/(1+η)
ηд
u′(0) − (1 + η) ϵκδγa
( ϵ−1
ϵ
)η/(1+η) (A42)
piд =
(1 + η)rn + u′(0)ηд
u′(0)δγaϵκ
( ϵ
ϵ−1
)η/(1+η) − (1 + η) . (A43)
Steady-state consumptionmay be above or below natural consumption, depending on the amount
of government spending. In the WUNKmodel, ination may be positive or negative, depending
on the amount of government spending.
The phase diagrams show that at the ZLB, the Euler-Phillips system is a source in the WUNK
model but a saddle in the NKmodel. An algebraic approach conrms this classication. Rewritten
in canonical form, the linearized Euler-Phillips system becomes[
Ûc
Ûpi
]
=
[
u′(0)cn −cn
−(1 + η)ϵκγa
( ϵ−1
ϵ
)η/(1+η)
δ
] [
c − cд
pi − piд
]
.
We denote the above matrix by M. We classify the Euler-Phillips system using the trace and
determinant ofM, as in appendix D.1:
tr(M) = δ + u′(0)cn
det(M) = δcn
[
u′(0) − (1 + η) ϵκ
δγa
(
ϵ − 1
ϵ
)η/(1+η)]
.
In the NKmodel,u′(0) = 0 so det(M) < 0, indicating that the Euler-Phillips system is a saddle.
In the WUNKmodel, condition (12) implies that det(M) > 0; since we also have tr(M) > 0, we
conclude that the Euler-Phillips system is a source. We can also show that tr(M)2 − 4 det(M) > 0,
which indicates that the system is a nodal source, not a spiral source.
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Appendix F. Proofs with government spending
We complement the proofs of propositions 5 and 9, which pertain to the model with government
spending.
F.1. Complement to the proof of proposition 5
We characterize the amount д∗ in the NKmodel, and we compute the limit of the government-
spending multiplier in the WUNKmodel.
In the NK model, the amount д∗ of government spending is the amount that makes the
unstable line of the dynamical system go through the natural steady state. With less spending
than д∗ (panel B of gure 5), the natural steady state is below the unstable line and is connected
to trajectories coming from the southwest quadrant of the phase diagram. Hence, for д < д∗,
limT→∞ c(0;д) = −∞. With more spending than д∗ (panel D of gure 5), the natural steady state
is above the unstable line and is connected to trajectories coming from the northeast quadrant.
Hence, for д > д∗, limT→∞ c(0;д) = +∞. Accordingly, for any s > 0, limT→∞m(д∗, s) = +∞.
In the WUNKmodel, when the ZLB is innitely long-lasting, the economy jumps to the ZLB
steady state at time 0: limT→∞ c(0;д) = cд(д), where cд(д) is given by (A42). The steady-state
consumption cд(д) is linear in government spending д, with a coefcient in front of д of
η
u′(0)δγaϵκ
( ϵ
ϵ−1
)η/(1+η) − (1 + η) .
Accordingly, for any s > 0, we have
lim
T→∞
m(д, s) = 1 + limT→∞ c(0;д + s/2) − limT→∞ c(0;д − s/2)
s
= 1 +
cд(д + s/2) − cд(д − s/2)
s
= 1 +
η
u′(0)δγaϵκ
( ϵ
ϵ−1
)η/(1+η) − (1 + η) ,
which corresponds to (13).
F.2. Complement to the proof of proposition 9
We compute the government-spending multiplier at the ZLB in the WUNKmodel. Private con-
sumption and ination at the ZLB steady state are determined by (A42) and (A43). The coefcients
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in front of government spending д in these expressions are
η
u′(0)δγaϵκ
( ϵ
ϵ−1
)η/(1+η) − (1 + η) and u′(0)ηu′(0)δγaϵκ ( ϵϵ−1 )η/(1+η) − (1 + η) .
Since (12) holds, both coefcients are positive. Hence, an increase inд raises private consumption
and ination. Moreover, dc/dд is given by the rst of these coefcient, which immediately yields
the expression for the multiplier dy/dд = 1 + dc/dд.
Appendix G. WUNK assumption in terms of estimable statistics
We re-express the WUNK assumption in terms of estimable statistics. We rst work on the model
with linear disutility of labor, in which the assumption is given by (9). We then turn to the model
with convex disutility of labor, in which the assumption is given by (12).
G.1. Linear disutility of labor
When the disutility of labor is linear, the WUNK assumption is given by (9). Multiplying (9) by yn,
we obtain
u′(0)yn > 1
δ
· y
nϵκ
γa
.
The time discount rate δ has been estimated in numerous studies. We therefore only need to
expressu′(0)yn and ynϵκ/(γa) in terms of estimable statistics.
First, the denition of the natural rate of interest, given by (5), implies thatu′(0)yn = δ−σ −rn.
Following the New Keynesian literature (for example, Woodford 2011, p. 20), we set the nancial-
intermediation spread to σ = 0 in normal times. Hence, in normal times,u′(0)yn = δ − rn. Thus,
u′(0)yn can be measured from the gap between the discount rate δ and the average natural rate
of interest rn—both of which have been estimated by many studies.
Second, we show that ynϵκ/(γa) can be measured from estimates of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve. To establish this, we compute the discrete-time New Keynesian Phillips curve
arising from our continuous-time model. We start from the rst-order approximation
pi (t) = pi (t + dt) − Ûpi (t + dt)dt
and use (1) to measure Ûpi (t + dt). We obtain
pi (t) = pi (t + dt) − δpi (t + dt)dt + y
nϵκ
γa
· y(t) − y
n
yn
dt .
66
(We have replaced y(t + dt)dt by y(t)dt since the difference between the two is of second order.)
Setting the unit of time to one quarter (as in the empirical literature) and dt = 1, we obtain
pi (t) = (1 − δ )pi (t + 1) + y
nϵκ
γa
x(t), (A44)
where pi (t) is quarterly ination at time t , pi (t + 1) is quarterly ination at time t + 1, and
x(t) = y(t) − y
n
yn
is the output gap at time t . Equation (A44) is a typical New Keynesian Phillips curve, so we can
measure ynϵκ/(γa) by estimating the coefcient on output gap in a standard New Keynesian
Phillips curve—which has been done many times.
To sum up, we rewrite the WUNK assumption as
δ − rn > λ
δ
,
where δ is the time discount rate, rn is the average natural interest rate, and λ is the output-gap
coefcient in a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve. This is just (14).
G.2. Convex disutility of labor
When the disutility of labor is convex, the WUNK assumption is given by (12):
u′(0)yn > 1
δ
· y
nϵκ
γa
(
ϵ − 1
ϵ
)η/(1+η)
(1 + η).
To rewrite this condition in terms of estimating statistics, we follow the previous method. The
only change occurs when computing the discrete-time New Keynesian Phillips curve arising from
the continuous-time model. To measure Ûpi (t + dt), we use (A40) with д = 0 and c = y . As a result,
(A44) becomes
pi (t) = (1 − δ )pi (t + 1) + y
nϵκ
γa
(
ϵ − 1
ϵ
)η/(1+η)
(1 + η)x(t),
where pi (t) and pi (t + 1) are quarterly ination rates and x(t) is the output gap. This is just a typical
New Keynesian Phillips curve. Hence, again, we can measure
ynϵκ
γa
(
ϵ − 1
ϵ
)η/(1+η)
(1 + η)
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by estimating the output-gap coefcient in a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve.
To conclude, just as with a linear disutility of labor, we can rewrite the WUNK assumption as
δ − rn > λ
δ
,
where δ is the time discount rate, rn is the average natural rate of interest, and λ is the output-gap
coefcient in a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve.
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